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"I'M GOING TO DINNER WITH FRANK": 
ADMISSIBILITY OF NONTESTIMONIAL 
STATEMENTS OF INTENT TO PROVE THE ACTIONS 
OF SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE SPEAKER-AND 
THE ROLE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Lynn McLain* 
INTRODUCTION 
A woman's corpse, punctured with stab wounds, is found in the 
San Bernadino Valley. Her roommate tells the police that before 
leaving their apartment the night before, the woman had said, "I'm 
going to dinner with Frank."! 
A teenage boy is missing, and his parents have received ransom 
notes. The boy's friends tell the police that he had said he was "going 
to meet Angelo in the parking lot" because Angelo was going to give 
him a free pound of marijuana. 2 
An employee reports to his supervisor that another person in the 
company has refused to falsify documents so as to improperly obtain 
Medicaid payments. The supervisor says, "I'll call Jim and have him 
take care of it."3 
In Frank's trial for murder, in Angelo's trial for kidnapping, and in 
Jim's criminal trial for Medicaid fraud, respectively, are the woman's, 
the boy's, and the supervisor's forward-looking statements admissible 
to inculpate Frank, Angelo, and Jim? Because none of the statements is 
"testimonial,"4 the Confrontation Clause erects no barrier to their 
* Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School 
of Law. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Robert Braun, J.D., 2009, and Jerome 
Trageser, J.D., 2010, for their research assistance, and to Barbara Coyle Fischer for her 
administrative assistance. 
1 These facts are those of People v. Alcalde, 148 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1944) (in bank). See infra 
notes 182-86 and accompanying text. 
2 These facts are those of People v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976). See infra notes 
158-60 and accompanying text. 
3 These facts are those of United States v. Best, 219 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2000). See infra note 
227 and accompanying text. 
4 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding, at least absent a defendant's 
forfeiture of his or her confrontation right by wrongdoing, when a declarant's statement is 
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admission against these criminal defendants in a post-Crawford v. 
Washington world. 5 But there remains a significant hurdle in the rules 
of evidence: Do the statements fall within the hearsay exception for 
statements of the declarant's state of mind? This hearsay exception 
would be clearly applicable if the statements were relevant only to the 
declarants' own intent, and thus to their own actions after making the 
statements. Federal Rule of Evidence (Rule) 803(3) and its state 
corollaries6 provide that the hearsay rule does not exclude "[a] 
"testimonial," the Confrontation Clause requires either (1) that the declarant of a statement 
offered against a criminal accused be subject to cross-examination by the defense at trial, or (2) 
that the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial and that the defense earlier had an opportunity 
to cross-examine the declarant about the statement). 
5 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (holding that the Confrontation Clause 
applies to hearsay only when it is "testimonial"; statements made in response to police 
interrogation to establish "past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution" are 
testimonial, whereas statements made "to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency" are nontestimonial). 
In dictum, the Crawford Court mentioned that "casual remark[s] to an acquaintance" were 
not testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; see also Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75,83-84 (1st Cir. 
2004) (finding that codefendant's statements to a friend that he needed money were 
nontestimonial); United States v. lohnson, 354 F. Supp. 2d 939, 959-60, 964 (N.D. Iowa 2005) 
(finding defense did not contend that murder victim's "off-the-cuff' statements to acquaintances 
and family members that he was "going to meet [the defendant]" were testimonial), aff'd in part, 
vacated in part, 495 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 32 (2008). The statements 
set forth in the text accompanying notes 1-3, supra, would seem to qualify as such "casual 
remarks" and are clearly nontestimonial. This Article focuses on clearly nontestimonial 
statements. 
It bears mention, however, that other forward-looking statements of a declarant's state of 
mind, where the declarant seems worried that she may be in danger from a particular person, such 
as, ''I'm meeting Frank tonight to pick up the kids, and if I'm not back in two hours, call the 
police," are arguably testimonial, even though they precede the commission of a crime. See 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (noting one possible definition of testimonial statements is "statements 
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial" (internal citation omitted)); Stoll v. 
State, 762 So. 2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000) (noting witness testified that murder victim had made her 
promise "that if anything ever happened to her [the witness] would go to the police and tell them 
that Michael did it"); cf Manning v. Buchan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1052-53 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(holding victim's statement to his wife "that ifhe turned up missing, she should 'tell the FBI the 
name of Steve Manning'" was inadmissible under the state of mind hearsay exception). But see 
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140, 142 (1999) (Breyer, 1., concurring) (expressing doubt as to 
whether the admission of statements made long before a crime occurred and without relation to 
the prospect of a future trial violates a defendant's confrontation right, rather than simply the 
hearsay rule of evidence); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (fmding 
victim's statements as to her fear of defendant were nontestimonial); Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 
76, 80 (Ga. 2004) (holding statement by the murder victim to a co-worker that the defendant was 
going to kill him was not testimonial: "[T]he victim's hearsay statements were not remotely 
similar to such prior testimony or police interrogation, as they were made in a conversation with a 
friend, before the commission of any crime, and without any reasonable expectation that they 
would be used at a later trial .... "). 
6 Approximately four-fifths of the states have adopted evidence codes derived from the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and their corollary Uniform Rules of Evidence. 5 LYNN McLAIN, 
MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL xl-xvii & n.2 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009) 
[hereinafter MARYLAND EVIDENCE]' See generally 1-4 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. 
SAL TZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES (1987 & Supp. 1994). 
2010] "I'M GOING TO DINNER WITH FRANK" 375 
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind ... (such as 
intent, plan, ... design ... ), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed .... "7 
In the above examples, however, the real meat of the declarants' 
statements is their relevance to prove not what the declarant alone did, 
but what the accuseds-Frank, Angelo, and Jim-did: They acted in 
accord with the declarant's plan. Both the federal and state courts are 
divided as to whether Rule 803(3)'s state of mind hearsay exception 
embraces such forward-looking statements of the declarant's intent that 
implicate someone else when offered to prove that third person's 
conduct after the statement was made. 8 The fundamental problem is 
that the declarant cannot speak to another person's present intent 
without basing the declarant's statement on memory or belief as to 
something that occurred in the past to give the declarant that idea.9 For 
this reason, numerous jurisdictions flatly prohibit the use of the 
declarant's statement of intent to prove the accused's intent. 10 Those 
jurisdictions will admit the evidence, if at all, with a limiting instruction 
that it is to be considered only as to the declarant's conduct and not as to 
the nondeclarant' s. 11 In stark contrast, many other jurisdictions see the 
evidence as both probative and irreplaceable and construe Rule 803(3) 
to freely allow use of the statement against the third person. 12 A 
subgroup of these, most notably the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, permits use against the nondeclarant, but conditions 
this use upon the proof of corroborating evidence implicating that 
person. 13 
This Article will provide background information 14 concerning the 
common law state of mind hearsay exception, including the seminal 
1892 United States Supreme Court decision in Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of New York v. Hillman,15 and of the adoption in the mid-
1970s of Rule 803(3).16 It then will discuss each of the current 
approaches to admissibility under Rule 803(3) of forward-looking 
statements to prove a nondeclarant's intent, and thus his or her 
7 FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
8 As the High Court of Australia aptly stated, "The authorities are in a state of disarray." 
Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283,289; see also infra Part III. 
9 See infra notes 50-51,107,121 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra Part III.A. 
11 See infra notes 105, 110, 113, 134-37 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra Part III.B. 
13 See infra Part III.C. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 Mut. Life Ins. Co. ofN.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). 
16 The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 
Stat. 1926. See generally 1-6 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. 
CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (9th ed. 2006) [hereinafter FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE MANUAL]. 
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subsequent actions. 17 It will argue that the corroborating-evidence 
approach as presently framed (as a prerequisite to admissibility against 
a criminal defendant), and long followed (apparently unchallenged) by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, among 
others, violated the Confrontation Clause pre-Crawford, as it 
contravened the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Idaho v. Wright. 18 
Wright precluded consideration of corroborating evidence to establish 
the reliability of hearsay offered against a criminal defendant in the 
context of the then-applicable Confrontation Clause jurisprudence under 
Ohio v. Roberts. 19 The status of Roberts, and thus of Wright, was 
thrown into doubt by Crawford. 
Crawford overruled Roberts' approach to the confrontation right 
and established a new analytical framework. Under this framework, the 
Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay and is satisfied 
only by the opportunity to cross-examine. 20 Although the Court had 
hinted in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause did not apply at all to 
nontestimonial hearsay, 21 it made that point explicit in its subsequent 
decision in Davis v. Washington. 22 In Whorton v. Bockting, Justice 
Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, hammered this point home, 
saying: 
[W]hatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced [as to 
testimonial statements] must be considered together with Crawford's 
elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission 
of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements. Under Roberts, 
an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-
17 See infra Part III. 
18 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
19 See infra notes 243-50 and accompanying text. 
20 See supra notes 4-5. 
21 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 (2004). 
Members of this Court and academics have suggested that we revise our doctrine to 
reflect more accurately the original understanding of the Clause. They offer two 
proposals: First, that we apply the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial statements, 
leaving the remainder to regulation by hearsay law-thus eliminating the overbreadth 
referred to above. Second, that we impose an absolute bar to statements that are 
testimonial, absent a prior opportunity to cross-examine-thus eliminating the 
excessive narrowness referred to above. In White, we considered the fITst proposal and 
rejected it. Although our analysis in this case casts doubt on that holding, we need not 
definitively resolve whether it survives our decision today, because Sylvia Crawford's 
statement is testimonial under any definition. 
/d. (citations omitted). 
22 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) ("It is the testimonial character of the 
statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon 
hearing evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause."). For pre-Crawford harbingers of 
this holding, see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140-43 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 
(Scalia, 1., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, 1., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); id. at 143-44 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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examination could not be admitted without a judicial determination 
regarding reliability. Under Crawford, on the other hand, the 
Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements and 
therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of 
reliability. 
It is thus unclear whether Crawford, on the whole, decreased or 
increased the number of unreliable out-of-court statements that may 
be admitted in criminal trials. 23 
377 
These pronouncements, predictably, have caused great alarm and 
speculation about whether there remain any constitutional restraints 
regarding the admissibility of non testimonial hearsay.24 
This author believes that the Court will use the due process clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments25 ("due process clause") to 
step into the gap that its rereading of the Confrontation Clause has 
created. Although the due process clause has been underutilized with 
regard to evidentiary matters in the past,26 Justices Thomas and Scalia 
have indicated interest in having it assume what they see as its rightful 
place in the constitutional galaxy, as arbiter of reliability and fairness. 27 
Recognizing that this argument expands the role of the due process 
clause from existing precedent, the Article will posit that both Roberts' 
standards for evaluating the reliability of hearsay and, more tenuously, 
Wright's holding, survive Crawford as to the admissibility of 
nontestimonial hearsay, but are now applicable by virtue of the due 
process clause, rather than the Confrontation Clause.28 Thus, using 
corroborating evidence to evaluate nontestimonial hearsay's reliability, 
as a condition to admissibility, remains constitutionally prohibited until 
the Court either overrules Wright or limits it to its facts. At present, 
23 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007). 
24 See, e.g., Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis and 
Bockting, 19 REGENT U. L. REv. 367, 370, 378 (2007) (lamenting that Bockting's comments as to 
nontestirnonial hearsay were made without "briefing or argument on the question whether there 
should be at least a minimal level of Sixth Amendment scrutiny for some forms ofnontestirnonial 
hearsay," stating that "[i]t was premature for the Court to resolve the constitutional status of 
nontestimonial hearsay at a time when the definition of testimonial hearsay is still so unsettled," 
and worrying that "[i]f Roberts is dead, states would presumably be free to modify these statutes 
and eliminate the reliability and unavailability requirements from these hearsay exceptions or, for 
that matter, to repeal the hearsay rule entirely with respect to nontestimonial hearsay"); Alex 
Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 74 (2008) ("[T]wo recent Supreme 
Court dicta [in Davis and Backting] seem to remove completely the defendants' constitutional 
protection against non-testimonial inculpatory statements."). 
25 See infra notes 270-70 and accompanying text. 
26 See Stein, supra note 24, at 66,68,71,89 (criticizing the Court as having "interpret[ed] the 
Due Process Clause, as related to evidence, very narrowly"; not applying it to protect against 
"informational risks"; and proposing that the Court should extend constitutional due process 
protection to "rules of evidential adequacy that determine which evidence is admissible and 
which evidence requires corroboration" by "expand[ing] the 'fundamental unfairness' category"). 
27 See supra note 22. 
28 See infra Part IV. 
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then, Wright circumscribes the choices available to the states and the 
lower federal courts with regard to the admission of forward-looking 
statements under Rule 803(3) and its state corollaries. This Article will 
therefore argue that the approach currently followed by the Second 
Circuit-requiring corroborating evidence to prove the reliability 
necessary for admissibility-remains unconstitutional, at least for now. 
The Article will conclude with another novel argument that flows 
from this conclusion: Admission of a declarant's forward-looking 
statements to inculpate an accused nondeclarant by proving the 
accused's subsequent conduct may be constitutionally accomplished 
post-Crawford within a due process paradigm under Wright if the 
consideration of corroborating evidence is moved from a reliability 
inquiry preceding admissibility to a review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to meet the burden of production at the close of the 
proponent's case. 29 This approach is consistent with the due process 
standard as it has been applied outside the Confrontation Clause context 
in reviewing sentencing, probation revocation, and administrative law 
judges' decisions, where the appellate court looks to be sure that the 
trier of fact's verdict was not necessarily based on unreliable hearsay.3o 
Thus, although recognizing that Professor Alex Stein has argued 
for a more vigorous constitutionalization of the law regarding the 
admissibility of evidence,31 this Article takes the position that, at the 
very least, the due process clause must afford criminal defendants the 
same protections in their trials as to guilt or innocence as the pre-
Crawford due process case law affords them in sentencing proceedings 
and parole revocation hearings. 32 This is merely the same level of 
protection provided to parties in administrative hearings, where neither 
life nor liberty is at stake. 33 
On the second issue addressed by this Article, this author argues 
that it is both unnecessary and unwise to forfeit probative and 
irreplaceable evidence,34 as is done in the jurisdictions that totally bar 
the use of a declarant's forward-looking statements to prove a non-
declarant's subsequent acts. Rather, jurisdictions ought to permit 
consideration of such evidence if it is corroborated. That requirement 
will serve the ultimate goal of fairness to the accused by not permitting 
a guilty verdict to be based on uncorroborated hearsay. 35 As long as 
Wright is good law, jurisdictions may codify, as an additional 
requirement to admissibility beyond that of reliability, the existence of 
29 See infra Part IV.e. 
30 See infra notes 281-86 and accompanying text. 
31 Stein, supra note 24. 
32 See infra notes 281-97 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 57, 235. 
35 See infra notes 296-99, 319, 323-25 and accompanying text. 
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corroborating evidence.36 Or they may, through their case law, simply 
move their consideration of corroborating evidence to the sufficiency 
review outlined above. 37 If and when Wright is overruled or limited to 
its facts, then the presence of corroborating evidence may be used in 
determining reliability for the purpose of admissibility. 38 
II. THE HILLMONDOCTRINE 
The "state of mind" hearsay exception, including "the Hillmon 
doctrine" regarding the admissibility of forward-looking statements,39 
first developed at common law. 4o The exception was codified, effective 
July 1, 1975,41 in Rule 803(3).42 
A. The Parameters of the Common Law Exception 
The common law hearsay exception for statements by a declarant 
as to his or her then-existing state of mind is premised on the notion that 
the hearsay dangers of perception and memory are not present. 43 When 
one asserts one's own current state of mind, and that assertion is offered 
to prove that one had that state of mind when one spoke,44 by definition 
there can be no memory problem; nor can there be a first-hand 
knowledge problem, as no one could better perceive one's then-existing 
state of mind than oneself. The statement is admissible under common 
36 See infra note 3 19 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text. 
38 Justice Kennedy has strongly voiced his preference for this approach. Idaho v. Wright, 497 
U.S. 805, 827, 828-31 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and 
Blackmun, JJ.); see infra text accompanying note 252. 
39 See infra Part II.B. 
40 See infra Part II.A. 
41 See supra note 16. 
42 See infra Part II.C. 
43 E.g., 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:71 
(3d ed. 2007). 
44 In contrast, when a declarant does not directly assert his or her state of mind, but his or her 
statement is circumstantial evidence of his or her belief, which is relevant to the case, the 
evidence is nonhearsay. See Figgins v. Cochrane, 920 A.2d 572, 590-92 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2007), affd, 942 A.2d 736 (Md. 2008); 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 6, §§ 801:10, 
801:13; see, e.g., State v. Magruder, 765 P.2d 716, 718-19 (Mont. 1988) (holding that, in 
response to a self-defense claim, a daughter's testimony was properly admitted as showing the 
victim-declarant's state of mind, where the daughter testified that her father, the victim, had told 
her that the defendant said he would be "packing a piece" following a telephone conversation 
with the defendant, i.e., the court admitted testimony that the victim believed the defendant would 
be armed and aggressive, rather than that the defendant was in fact armed). 
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law to prove the declarant's state of mind, as long as the declarant's 
state of mind is relevant to the case45 and circumstances do not indicate 
45 5 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.05[2][a], at 803-31 to -32 & nn.5-13 (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN]; see. e.g., Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 
922 F.2d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding evidence inadmissible when defendant's state of mind 
was irrelevant); People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18,27-31 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (holding reversible 
error to admit murder victim's statements that she feared defendant, when victim's state of mind 
was not at issue); Graves v. Spedden, 46 Md. 527 (1877) (holding evidence of donor's statements 
admissible to show whether he intended conveyance to be advancement or absolute gift); Sanborn 
v. Lang, 41 Md. 107, 114-15 (1874) ("To ascertain the intent and purpose with which the deed 
was made, we must refer to the facts and circumstances attending its execution, and the acts and 
conduct of the parties .... "); Cross v. Black, 9 G. & J. 198, 210-11 (Md. (837) (holding 
statements of a party that he intended to settle in Missouri, made while preparing to leave 
Maryland, were admissible in his favor on issue of his intent); Baptiste v. De Volunbrun, 5 H. & 
J. 86,97 (Md. (820) (holding statements of declarant's intention to return to foreign island when 
the troubles there had ceased were admissible to establish that intention); Hanlon v. Davis, 545 
A.2d 72, 76-77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (holding third party reactions to libelous statement 
were admissible as relevant to the case); Ebert v. Ritchey, 458 A.2d 891,896-97 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1983) (admitting decedent's statements of testamentary intent); Santoni v. Moodie, 452 
A.2d 1223, 1229-34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. (982) (holding exclusion of statement of decedent to 
wife that there was--or he believed there was-no risk in taking drug was reversible error; it was 
admissible to prove decedent's state of mind, i.e., that he was unaware of risk and therefore not 
contributorily negligent). See also State v. Phillips, 461 S.E.2d 75, 88-92 (W. Va. (995), in 
which the court held it was reversible error to admit testimony that murder victim said "she 
believed the defendant was having an affair and, when she returned to West Virginia, she would 
divorce him and seek half of the marital assets." The court explained: 
Although the declarant's state of mind does not have to be directly in issue for the 
statement to be admissible under Rule 803(3), where a statement is introduced to show 
the declarant subsequently acted in compliance with this state of mind, the state of 
mind must be relevant. In this case, the declarant's state of mind was not directly in 
issue and was only remotely related to the issues in this case. 
Id. at 90 (footnote omitted); see also infra notes 84, 123. 
Responses to opinion polls and surveys have been admitted under this branch of the state of 
mind exception, when, for example, in a trademark or unfair competition case, the declarant says, 
"this product is made by [the plaintiff]," and the evidence is offered not to show the truth of the 
declarant's assertion, but that the consuming public mistakenly believes that the defendant's 
product is the plaintiff's product. E.g., KOS Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 719 (3d 
Cir. 2004); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976); Gibson 
Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P., 311 F. Supp. 2d 690, 709 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. 2004), 
(finding declarants' perceptions as to manufacturer of guitar admissible under both Rules 803(1) 
and 803(3)), rev'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 423 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Microwave Sys. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215-16 (S.D. Iowa 2000) 
(internet postings admissible to show consumers' confusion in trademark infringement suit), 
ajJ'd, 238 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2001); Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 526, 
538-39 (W.D. Va. 1999) (holding, in Title IX case, survey of high school girls as to how they 
then felt about the scheduling of boys' and girls' sports admissible); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. 
BC-USA, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 344, 347-48 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding in trademark infringement 
case, customers' statements that they thought the brands were the same, disclosing their confused 
state of mind, were admissible); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imp., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 682-84 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). But cf Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(holding survey offered to prove truth of interviewees' statements as to number of cracks in their 
homes was inadmissible hearsay); Pitt. Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 757-60 (3d Cir. 
1978) (similar holding); United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 884 (S.D. Ind. 
2003) (finding survey/poll offered to prove truth of matters asserted by participants concerning 
projects over sixty years old was inadmissible hearsay). 
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that the declarant was insincere.46 
The common law exception does not permit such statements to be 
introduced to prove either an existing or a past fact that has created the 
declarant's state ofmind.47 In its landmark 1933 decision in Shepard v. 
United States, the United States Supreme Court found that the trial court 
had committed reversible error in admitting, as proof of the truth of the 
matter asserted by the declarant, evidence of the deceased's wife's 
statement, "Dr. Shepard [the murder defendant] has poisoned me."48 
The statement did not qualify under the hearsay exception for dying 
declarations.49 Nor did it qualify within the common law state of mind 
exception to prove that the declarant had no intent to commit suicide. 
"The testimony ... faced backward and not forward. . .. What is even 
more important, it spoke to a past act, and, more than that, to an act by 
some one not the speaker."50 These circumstances created hearsay 
46 E.g., United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1982), ajJ'd in part, rev'd 
in part on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983); Deane Buick Co. v. Kendall, 417 P.2d 11, 
13-14 (Colo. 1966); Kirkland v. State, 540 A.2d 490, 492-93 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); 
Robinson v. State, 503 A.2d 725, 731-34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (finding no error in 
excluding proof offered to show that defendant accidentally shot her estranged lover, where 
defendant one month earlier said she was buying the gun to protect herself against robbers and 
burglars); Santoni v. Moodie, 452 A.2d 1223, 1232 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Vergie M. 
Lapelosa, Inc. v. Cruze, 407 A.2d 786, 790-91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (holding proffered 
testimony of one plaintiff in medical malpractice action was properly excluded when 
circumstances did not indicate decedent's sincerity as to alleged statements made to plaintiff 
regarding decedent's feelings about his prospective surgery; additionally, trial court determined 
that statements were offered to prove defendant's negligence rather than decedent's state of 
mind); State v. Vestal, 180 S.E.2d 755, 768-73 (N.C. 1971); WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 803-31 
& n.4; 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1725, at 129 (James 
H. Chadbourn rev., 1976) (describing that statement of design or plan "must appear to have been 
made in a natural matter and not under circumstances of suspicion"). 
The guarantee of sincerity was seemingly found to have been met through the spontaneity of 
the statement. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 274 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]' 
47 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 803(3):1. 
48 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1933). 
49 [d. at 99. 
50 [d. at lO6; accord Conyers v. State, 729 A.2d 910,924-25 (Md. 1999); Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Kuhl, 463 A.2d 822, 826 (Md. 1983) (holding portion of statement given to police twelve 
hours after event, stating that declarant had "accidentally" run into boy, was not admissible under 
state of mind hearsay exception; it "was merely an attempt to explain [the declarant's] former 
conduct rather than [a statement] which was evidence of his intent at the time in which the 
statement was made"); Brafinan v. State, 349 A.2d 632, 632 (Md. 1976) (holding reversible error 
to admit evidence that defendant's father broke down when police officer was explaining charges 
against his son and said, "I knew it, I knew it"; evidence was relevant not to prove father's state 
of mind, but rather to show his son was guilty); Rosman v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, 96 A. 
875, 877 (Md. 1916) (finding, in life insurance policy action defended on ground of suicide, 
statements of insured deceased, made several days after the occurrence, that he had taken aspirin 
tablets, were properly excluded when offered to show that he had mistakenly taken bichloride 
instead of aspirin); Miller v. State ex reI. Fiery, 8 Gill 141 (Md. 1849) (holding declarations of 
party after signing a bond that he signed it with the understanding that another person was to sign 
it as surety, were not admissible as part of res gestae). 
382 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
dangers of both perception and memory. 51 
On the other hand, the common law permitted the admission of a 
statement of the declarant's present state of mind that included a 
statement looking forward into the future to show that the declarant 
subsequently acted in accordance with his or her stated intention. 52 
Here, where the declarant speaks only of his or her own present intent, 
there can be no perception or memory problems. 53 There can be, of 
course, the risk of insincerity, and if the circumstances indicate 
insincerity, the trial court may exclude the statement. 54 Such "forward-
looking" statements also bear the risk of changes in plans or 
circumstances that interfere with the declarant's accomplishment of the 
stated goal. But these frailties are well within a jury's experience. 55 A 
jury knows that even "the best-Iaid"56 plans are not always carried out; 
it therefore is unlikely to overvalue the statement and give it undue 
weight. 57 This "forward-looking" use of a state of mind declaration was 
51 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 43, § 8:73; WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, 
§ 803.05[2][b]. 
52 E.g., Md. Paper Prods. Co. v. Judson, 139 A.2d 219, 226 (Md. 1958) (holding reversible 
error to refuse to admit deceased wife's testimony that, on morning of fatal accident, deceased 
had told her that he intended to stop on the way to work to pick up a gear wheel to be used in one 
of defendant-employer's machines; evidence was admissible to show that deceased was acting in 
course of employment at time of accident); Tittlebaum v. Penn. R.R., 174 A. 89, 90-91 (Md. 
1934) (holding proper to admit testimony of one boy that companion had picked up brick and said 
he was going to "bust a window" and that witness saw companion throw brick in direction of 
passing train, to show that brick broke window on train, even though witness did not see where 
brick struck); Bait. & O. R. Co. v. State ex rei. Chambers, 32 A. 201,202 (Md. 1895) (fmding 
decedent's declaration of intention to travel to Washington was admissible to show that he had 
right to be on defendant's property and to take particular route, on his way to defendant's ticket 
office); Cooke v. Cooke, 43 Md. 522, 532-33 (1876) (fmding statements of fraudulent intent were 
admissible); Kirkland v. State, 540 A.2d 490, 493 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Sobus v. Knisley, 
273 A.2d 227,231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (holding, in negligence action by plaintiff who, like 
defendant, could not remember collision or events of few moments preceding, testimony of 
policeman that plaintiff had told him of his intention to take certain route was admissible to show 
that plaintiff subsequently took that route); cf Farah v. Stout, 684 A.2d 471, 477 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1996) (fmding state of mind exception inapplicable as to forward-looking statements of 
intent not offered to show subsequent conduct). But see Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 
283, 307 (Aust!.) (Deane, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence should not have been admitted 
even to prove deceased declarant's intention or subsequent conduct). 
53 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 803(3): I. 
54 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
55 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 803(3): I. 
56 ROBERT BURNS, To a Mouse, On Turning Her Up in Her Nest with the Plough. November 
1785, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS: CONTAINING HIS POEMS, SONGS, AND 
CORRESPONDENCE 106 (Allan Cunningham ed., Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1859) ("But, Mousie, 
thou art no thy lane,lIn proving foresight may be vain:lThe best laid schemes 0' mice an' 
men,lGang aft a-gley,lAn' lea'e us nought but grief and pain,lFor promis'djoy."). 
57 See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Siesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-
State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1929) (asserting that the rationale for the 
state of mind exception for statements of intention is that the utterance "will be more accurate 
than the memory of that state of mind years later," and "[t]he jury knows that plans are frequently 
not carried out, and can give proper weight to expressions of them"). 
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the focus of the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon. 58 
B. Hillmon 
The Hillmon case was one of several brought by Mrs. Hillmon on 
four life insurance policies bought on her husband's life in the slightly 
more than three-month span between November 30, 1878 and March 4, 
1879.59 Mrs. Hillmon alleged that Mr. Hillmon died on March 18, 1879 
and that his body had been found at Crooked Creek, Colorado. 60 The 
insurer argued that Mr. Hillmon was alive and that the body was instead 
that of F.A. Walters, who had not been heard from since early March 
1879.61 The insurer offered into evidence proof of letters dated early 
March 1879 from Walters to his sister and fiancee stating that he 
intended to leave Wichita, Kansas, for Crooked Creek, Colorado, with 
Mr. Hillmon, who had promised him work. 62 The trial court excluded 
the evidence, and the jury found for Mrs. Hillmon. 63 
The Supreme Court reversed on another ground, but because the 
evidentiary issue was likely to arise on retrial, it pointed out that the 
evidence of the letters was admissible. 64 Justice Gray, writing for the 
Court, stated: 
The letters in question were competent ... as evidence that, 
shortly before the time when other evidence tended to show that the 
[declarant Walters] went away, he had the intention of going, and of 
going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he did 
go and that he went with Hillmon than if there had been no proof of 
such intention. 65 
58 145 U.S. 285 (1892). See generally Hutchins & Siesinger, supra note 57; Brooks W. 
MacCracken, The Case of the Anonymous Corpse, 19 AM. HERITAGE 50 (No.4, Jun. 1968); Glen 
Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REv. 
145 (1991); Thomas A. Wiseman, III, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the Criminal 
Defendant: The Limits of the Hillmon Doctrine, 35 V AND L. REv. 659 (1982). 
Recent exhumation of the remains at issue in Hillmon has been undertaken to attempt to 
ascertain their true identity with the assistance of DNA analysis. See Marianne Wesson, 
"Particular Intentions": The Hillmon Case and the Supreme Court, 18 LAW & LIT. 343 (2006); 
Marianne Wesson, State of Mind: The Hillmon Case, the McGuffin, and the Supreme Court, in 
EVIDENCE STORIES (R. Lempter ed. 2006) (suggesting that insurance companies may have 
committed fraud). 
59 Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 285-86. 
60 Id. at 287. 
61 !d. 
62 !d. at 287-89. 
63 Id. 
64 !d. at 293. 
65 Id. at 295-96 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the Hillman Court stated that the letters were admissible not 
only to prove that the declarant, Walters, subsequently went to Crooked 
Creek, but also to show that Hillmon went with him.66 
Under the facts of the case, both parties wanted to show that 
Hillmon was at Crooked Creek-the insurance company to show that 
Hillmon had murdered Walters and substituted his body for Hillmon's 
in an insurance fraud conspiracy, and Mrs. Hillmon to show that the 
body was Hillmon's67-so the point was not one that Mrs. Hillmon 
would have contested. Justice Gray's statement might be disregarded as 
dictum on an unbriefed and unargued issue. 68 But his proffered support 
for his conclusion makes it difficult to so easily dismiss the matter. 
To support the proposition of admissibility of Walters' statement to 
prove not only his, but Hillmon's, subsequent action, Justice Gray69 
relied on Hunter v. State, a New Jersey decision that had declared 
admissible as part of the res gestae the declarant's statement, on the 
night of his murder, that he was going away on business with the person 
later tried for his murder. 70 In Hillman, Justice Gray quoted with 
approval the following statement by the Hunter court: 
If it is legitimate to show by a man's own declarations that he left his 
home to be gone a week, or for a certain destination, which seems 
uncontestable, why may it not be proved in the same way that a 
designated person was to bear him company? At the time the words 
were uttered or written, they imported no wrongdoing to anyone, and 
the reference to the companion who was to go with him was nothing 
more, as matters then stood, than an indication of an additional 
circumstance of his going.?l 
This quotation made the Hillman Court's statement as to the 
admissibility of Walters' stated intent to prove Hillmon's subsequent 
conduct appear to be carefully considered. 
It is interesting to note that the part of Hunter quoted by Justice 
Gray was not the holding of the case. The Hunter court held that, due to 
the presence of testimony that the defendant had also said he would 
66 Id. 
67 See supra text accompanying notes 60-6J. 
68 This author has been unable to discover whether this sub-issue was briefed or argued. But 
the Court's practice of reaching issues it need not reach to resolve the case before it continues to 
this day. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, 
joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (criticizing the majority for revising the Miranda 
doctrine when the case could have been resolved under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d»; Kirkpatrick, supra note 24, at 370 (criticizing the 
Court's opinion in Whorton v. Hockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007), for holding forth on an unbriefed 
and unargued question). 
69 Hillman, 145 U.S. at 299. 
70 Hunter v. State, 40 N.lL. 495 (1878). 
7l Hillman, 145 U.S. at 299 (quoting Hunter, 40 NJ.L. at 534, 536-38). Thus, under 
Crawford, the statements would have been nontestimonial. See supra note 5. 
2010] "I'M GOING TO DINNER WITH FRANK" 385 
meet the deceased, it need not decide whether the deceased's statement 
would be admissible as relevant to the defendant's subsequent 
conduct.72 Chief Judge Beasley's words quoted above were dictum 
expressing that he would be inclined to find the evidence admissible as 
part of the res gestae 73 to prove the defendant's conduct,74 even if the 
question were presented without that independent corroboration, as long 
as it comported with the general common law requirement that the 
declarant appears to have been sincere. 75 
Unlike Hillman, which focused on the state of mind exception, 76 
other nineteenth century state cases found forward-looking statements 
admissible to prove both the declarant's and nondeclarant's subsequent 
actions only if either, as in Hunter, the statements were found to be part 
of the res gestae77 or if they were made in the third person's (the 
opposing party's) presence,78 presumably as a tacit admission by the 
opposing party. 79 
The Shepard Court carefully limited the state of mind exception. It 
referred to Hillman as "the high water" mark beyond which the Court 
!d. 
72 Hunter, 40 N.J.L. at 540. 
I find myself constrained to think that the declarations under discussion, even if they 
stood in the case unsupported or unaffected by other circumstances, were admissible, 
on general principles, on the single ground that they were the natural and inartificial 
concomitants of a probable act, which itself was a part of the res gestae. In such a 
status of the evidence, I should think that the exception to the principle that rules out 
hearsay, had been carried to its extreme limit, but without transcending such limit. 
But, in point of fact, the question thus discussed is not, on this record, presented in this 
narrow point of view, for it is, in the proofs, connected with [testimony that defendant 
had said he would meet deceased] that appear to put the admissibility of these 
declarations on a stable foundation. 
73 !d. at 536-38. 
74 !d. at 540. 
75 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
76 Hillman, 145 U.S. at 295. 
77 E.g., Kilgore v. Stanley, 8 So. 130, 131 (Ala. 1890) ("What a person says on setting out on 
a journey, or to go to a particular place, explanatory of the object he has in view in so setting out, 
is res gestae evidence, and may be proven; and the jury may give it such weight as they think it 
[is] entitled to."). In West v. Price's Heirs, 25 Ky. 380, 383, 1829 WL 1399, at *3 (1829), the 
Kentucky Supreme Court asserted: 
Id. 
Conversations, or declarations, made by the actor or party concerned, at the time an act 
is done, and which explain the quo animo and design of the performance, may, 
whenever the nature of the act is called in question, be given in evidence, as part ofthe 
res gestae. Without tolerating this explanation of the acts of men, by receiving their 
accompanying declarations, we should be often misled as to their true nature and 
character; and consequently, liable to fall into errors, in respect to them. The rule 
requiring res gestae declarations to be received as evidence, is a necessary, and very 
useful one .... 
78 E.g., Parker v. Commonwealth, 51 S.W. 573, 574 (Ky. 1899) (holding reversible error to 
admit murder victim's statement, before fatal encounter, as "to his purpose in going down the 
road," when statement was not made in accused's presence); Kirby v. State, 17 Tenn. 383 (1836). 
79 See generally 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 801(4):3. 
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would not go, else it would "be an end" to the hearsay rule, "or nearly 
that." 80 
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) 
Almost a century after Hillman, Rule 803(3) codified the common 
law hearsay exception for statements of "then existing state of mind" as 
follows: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: ... A statement of the declarant's 
then existing state of mind [or] emotion ... (such as intent, plan, 
motive, design, [and] mental feeling ... ), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, 
or terms of declarant's will. 81 
Rule 803(3) clearly codified both the common law inadmissibility 
of "backward-looking" (Shepard-type)82 statements under the state of 
mind hearsay exception,83 and the common law admissibility of 
statements of the declarant's then-existing state of mind when offered 
80 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1933). 
81 FED. R. EVID. 803(3). The Rule went into effect in 1975. See supra note 16. 
82 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Samaniego, 345 F.3d 1280 (l1th Cir. 2003) (holding error to 
admit under Rule 803(3) proof of alleged thiefs apology to original owner for stealing 
professional boxer championship belts, in effort to show that belts were stolen and current 
possessor had no right to them; however, because declarant was unavailable to testifY, statement 
was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)); United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 548-49 (5th Cir. 
2001) (finding that district court correctly excluded defendant's former bookkeeper's statements 
that it was her fault she had not recorded a $400,000 fee defendant received); United States v. 
Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 726-27 (3d Cir. 1999) (fmding innocent explanation given to police for 
declarant's presence at scene was inadmissible); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 63 F.3d 754, 
760 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding evidence properly excluded when offered to show facts remembered 
or believed); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1491-93 (lOth Cir. 1993) (finding proper to 
exclude the part of wife's statement that she was afraid of defendant husband because he had 
threatened her); United States v. Liu, 960 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding proper to 
exclude part of statement regarding cause for declarant's fear); United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 
805, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding proper to exclude proffered testimony that defendant had 
said he was scared because of threats made by government agents he believed to be members of a 
crime family); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 879-87 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that, in 
prosecution of individuals named Beanny and Eric, it was error to preclude government witness 
from testifying that murder victim handed him slip of paper a few minutes before he was killed 
which read "Beanny, Eric 635-3135," because paper was nonhearsay; however, the trial court was 
correct in excluding testimony that victim said to call the police ifhe did not return home by three 
o'clock the next day and give them the number on the slip of paper, because there was "too great 
a potential for unfair prejudice" from a possible inference about defendants' past conduct 
(emphasis added)); Sanft v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 453, 456-59 (N.D. Iowa 2003) 
(granting motion to strike portions of affidavit that were statements of memory or belief); United 
States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 410-27 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding backward-looking 
statements inadmissible under Rule 803(3)), ajJ'd, 38 F. App'x 961 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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either (I) to show that the declarant had that state of mind, which state 
of mind is relevant to the case,84 or (2) as forward-looking (Hillmon-
type) statements to show that the declarant subsequently acted in accord 
with his or her stated intent, which action is relevant to the case. 85 
84 E.g., Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding victim's statements 
that she was scared of the defendant and that he verbally and physically abused her were properly 
admitted as evidence of her mental state, because defense implied that she had committed 
suicide); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-85 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding defendant's 
compatriot's statement showing that he had a motive for robbing felony murder victim was 
relevant); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding defendant's state of 
mind during taped conversation with informant was relevant, though it was not an abuse of 
discretion to exclude it); United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 769 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that 
it was relevant that declarant intended his check to be a reimbursement to defendant); United 
States v. Bartelho, 129 F.3d 663,668-69 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding defendant's evidence was 
inadmissible because defendant's state of mind was irrelevant to the case); United States v. 
Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1535 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding evidence of victim's state of mind was 
relevant to defendant's motive to kill her); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 
566 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding testator's intent to change his beneficiary relevant to show testator's 
state of mind); Turpin v. Kassulke, 26 F.3d 1392, 1399-1401 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding defendant's 
diary entry was admissible as both a party admission of accused and a statement of her then 
existing state of mind to show motive to kill her husband); Cincinnati Fluid Power, Inc. v. 
Rexnord, Inc., 797 F.2d 1386, 1394-95 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding reversible error to admit 
landlord's out-of-court statements concerning future rental agreements with plaintiff where intent 
was not at issue); United States v. Adcock, 558 F.2d 397, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding 
extortion victim's statements admissible to show state of mind of fear of economic loss); United 
States v. Taglione, 546 F.2d 194, 200-03 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding error to exclude testimony 
about accused's conversation with attorney regarding his ability to negotiate a reward for the 
return of property, because evidence showed accused's then existing state of mind); United States 
v. Smallwood, 299 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding that, had victim's roommate 
testified that victim said he was nervous, testimony would be admissible under Rule 803(3)), affd 
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2006); Weststeyn Dairy 
2 v. Eades Commodities Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (holding, in action for 
conversion and unjust enrichment, statements by sales agents that they intended to establish trust 
accounts for prepayments were relevant to establish sales agents' then existing state of mind); 
Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 414, 427 (admitting some evidence to prove declarant's then existing 
fear) aff'd, 38 F. App'x 961; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (holding First 
Amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of defendant's speech to show motive or 
intent); supra note 45. 
85 E.g., Southex Exhibitions, Inc. v. R.I. Builders Ass'n, 279 F.3d 94, 103 n.8 (Ist Cir. 2002) 
(finding district court did not abuse discretion in admitting declarant's statement regarding his 
understanding of contract before he signed it); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thien, 8 F.3d 1307, 
1312-13 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding error to exclude statement regarding insured-declarant's intent 
prior to his death); United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1493-95 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding 
reversible error to exclude statements by alleged homicide victim proffered to show declarant's 
suicidal state of mind); United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 238-40 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding 
error to exclude defendant's Hillman-type statement); United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 
737-38 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding evidence was properly admitted to show that deceased declarant 
acted in accordance with her plan to convince her husband that they were being evicted, giving 
defendant husband a motive to kill her); United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 842-43 (4th Cir. 
1978) ("Johnson's closing remark [over the telephone], 'I'm on my way' nevertheless would be 
admissible under Rule 803(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, both to show her intent and to 
promote an inference that she actually effectuated her intent and set out for Lyles' house." 
(footnote omitted)); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 910 & n.20 (8th Cir. 1975) (fmding 
deceased's statement that he intended to talk to defendant about cancelling insurance and leaving 
partnership was properly admitted to show that he had that conversation with defendant); United 
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Whether the Rule permits these last "forward-looking" statements 
to be admitted to prove a nondeclarant's subsequent conduct, however, 
is where the waters become troubled. When used for this purpose, even 
if the declarant is sincere, perception and memory problems are 
introduced because the declarant is speaking implicitly about someone 
else's intentions, and must be basing his or her statement on some 
previous communication from or with the nondeclarant. 86 The 
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 803 explicitly states: "The rule of 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, allowing evidence of intention as 
tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left 
undisturbed." 87 But there is lack of clarity as to what is the Hillmon 
"rule." True, the express language of Hillmon states that the declarant's 
statement of intent was admissible to prove "both that [the declarant] 
did go and that he went with Hillmon .... "88 Yet under the facts of 
that case, the party opposing the introduction of that evidence was also 
trying to prove that Hillmon had gone to Crooked Creek (in order to 
States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249-50 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (finding murder victim's 
statements that she was going to talk to defendant about his obtaining benefits for their unborn 
child was admissible); Smallwood, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 584-88 (finding murder victim's statements 
of intent were admissible to show that he "intended to meet the defendants on the day of his 
murder and that he in fact did so"), ajf'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Smith, 452 
F.3d 323; Sanft, 216 F.R.D. at 458 (holding that employee's statements of intent to not become 
named plaintiff in case due to his continued employment were admissible to show employee's 
then existing state of mind); Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 420-24,427 (holding that deceased alleged 
kidnapping victim's statements that she was going to defendant's home were admissible to create 
an inference that she did go there) ajf'd, 38 F. App'x 961; Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 
828 F. Supp. 379, 388-89 (D.S.C. 1993) (finding declarant's statements of intention to change 
insurance beneficiary were admissible). But see United States v. Hogan, 886 F.2d 1497, 1511-12 
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence was properly excluded when statement of intent was vague 
and had no apparent nexus in time to intended act); Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840 at 844-45 (Widener, J., 
dissenting) (dissenting on ground that evidence was misused); infra notes 123-31 and 
accompanying text. 
86 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 43, § 8:72; GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES 1. 
DUANE, WEISSENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.15 at 385-88 (5th ed. 2006); Douglas D. 
McFarland, Dead Men Tell Tales: Thirty Times Three Years of the Judicial Process After 
Hillmon, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1985); James W. Payne, Jr., The Hillmon Case-An Old Problem 
Revisited, 41 VA. L. REv. 1011 (1955); Eustace Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 
HARV. L. REv. 146 (1913); Diane Kiesel, Note, One Person's Thoughts, Another Person's Acts: 
How the Federal Circuit Courts Interpret the Hillmon Doctrine, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 699 (1984). 
These weaknesses are also reflected in the "opinion rule" of evidence. See, e.g., Hembree v. 
State, 101 So. 221 (Ala. Ct. App. 1924) (stating lay witness cannot opine about mental state of 
accused). The part of such a statement relevant to the third person may be analyzed as an implied 
assertion of the declarant. See Colin Tapper, Hillmon Rediscovered and Lord St. Leonards 
Resurrected, 106 LAW Q. REv. 441 (1990) (criticizing High Court of Australia's decision in 
Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283); Weissenberger, supra note 58 (analyzing part of 
statement relevant to third person as an implied assertion and thus as nonhearsay under Federal 
Rules of Evidence). 
87 FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note. 
88 Mut. Life lns. Co. of N.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285,296 (1892). 
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show that the body was Hillmon's),89 so this point was not in 
controversy. 
Under the facts of Hillmon, it was the declarant's conduct after he 
made the forward-looking statements that was the contested issue. 9o 
The statements were offered by the insurance company to prove that it 
was the declarant's (Walters') corpse , and not the insured's 
(Hillmon's), that was found at Crooked Creek.91 One can argue, then, 
that Supreme Court precedent does not strongly support use of a 
declarant's forward-looking statement against a third person.92 
Accordingly, the report of the House Committee of the Judiciary made 
clear its reading that Rule 803(3) was not to be used to prove the act of 
anyone other than the declarant. 93 The House Report states: "Rule 
803(3) was approved in the form submitted by the Court to Congress. 
However, the Committee intends that the Rule be construed to limit the 
doctrine of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, so as to render 
statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future 
conduct, not the future conduct of another person."94 
As a result of the conflict between the language used in Hillmon 
and the restriction expressed in the House Report, and in the absence of 
a post-Federal Rules of Evidence Supreme Court decision on point, the 
lower federal courts are divided on the question of whether a declarant's 
forward-looking statement may be admitted under Rule 803(3) to prove 
a nondec1arant's subsequent conduct. 95 At least three approaches have 
emerged. 96 
III. THE COMPETING ApPROACHES FOLLOWED IN THE LOWER COURTS' 
CASE LAW 
A number of lower federal and state courts have adhered to the 
restriction in the House Report. 97 Some courts approve the admission 
of the part of the forward-looking statement referring to a third person, 
but with a limiting instruction that it be considered only as to the 
89 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
90 Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 296. 
91 [d. 
92 See 4 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANuAL, supra note 16, § 803.02[4][c], at 803-27 
n.34 ("[T]he actual precedential import of [Hillmon's] extension of the state of mind exception is 
subject to doubt."); see also supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. 
93 H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7087. 
94 [d. 
95 4 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANuAL, supra note 16, § 803.02[4][c], at 803-28; David 
E. Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Few Surprises, 12 HOFSTRAL. REv. 453, 480-88 
(1984). 
96 See generally Wiseman, supra note 58. 
97 See infra Part III.A. 
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declarant's intent or conduct.98 Other courts have read Rule 803(3) 
broadly and freely admit one person's forward-looking statement, which 
refers to another person, to prove the nondeclarant's subsequent 
conduct. 99 A third approach holds that the statement will be admissible 
against the nondeclarant, but only if there is independent evidence 
connecting the declarant's statement with the nondeclarant's 
activities.lOo The first two approaches are constitutionally permissible, 
but have other practical or policy drawbacks; 101 the third seems 
intuitively fair, but, in this author's opinion, contravenes the Supreme 
Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright. 102 
A. Courts Following the Restrictive Approach Envisioned by the 
House Report 
Numerous courts have followed the restriction set forth in the 
House Report to Rule 803(3)103 so as to admit a forward-looking 
statement only to prove the declarant's subsequent conduct and not the 
conduct of another. These include the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the First,l04 Third,105 Fourth, 106 and Tenth 107 Circuits. 
98 See infra notes 105, 110, 113, 134-35. 
99 See infra Part IILB. 
100 See infra Part IILC. 
101 See infra Part IV.C. 
102 See infra Part IV. 
103 See supra note 93. 
104 See Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 677, 680 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978) (noting that 
declarant's statements of intent to see defendant would not be admissible against defendant). 
105 See Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The preferred 
course would have been to give a limiting instmction that [the declarant's] statement was not 
admissible to show the participation of [others] in the conspiracy."), overruled on other grounds, 
Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division), 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981). 
106 See United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1978), where the majority held that 
evidence was not used to prove other's acts: 
[Defendant's girlfriend's] salutation to [third person over phone], "I'm on my way," 
(or even a statement that she would come over with [the defendant]) would be 
inadmissible under the Congress's limitation if offered solely to prove that [the 
defendant] did accompany [his girlfriend]. However, the purpose of the proffer here 
was not to show that [the defendant] drove to the [third party's] residence[-] 
substantial independent evidence was introduced on that point[-]but rather solely to 
show why [the defendant] left home in the middle of the night, drove across town, and 
let [his girlfriend] out in the 1200 block of North Ellwood Avenue ... , The purpose 
was not to show [the defendant's] conduct on the night in question. Further, ... we 
have concluded that [the girlfriend's] state of mind was material, given the 
circumstances of this case. 
[d. at 843-44. Judge Widener dissented, asserting that the evidence constituted inadmissible 
hearsay: 
The only thing the tapes were needed for, from the government's standpoint, was to 
support an inference that Johnson asked [the defendant] to drive her by Lyles' house, 
and that [the defendant] therefore lied to the grand jury when he denied knowledge of 
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At the state level, both Alaska and Maryland chose to incorporate 
the House position when codifying their rules of evidence by including 
the limitation that the evidence is admissible if "offered to prove [the 
declarant's] present condition or future action." 108 Arizona, 109 
Delaware, llO Illinois, lli Michigan, 112 Oregon, 113 Pennsylvania, 114 
where Johnson was going. Given this central purpose, lhe laped conversations were 
[inadmissible] hearsay. . .. I think lhe majority's application of Rule 803(3) of lhe 
Federal Rules of Evidence is erroneous. As lhe court correctly observes, lhe hearsay 
exception for slatements of a declarant's existing slate of mind is applicable only to 
admit proof of lhe declarant's future conduct, not lhat of lhird persons. 
[d. at 844-45 (Widener, J., dissenting); see also Robin K. Vinson, Note, Evidence-The State of 
Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule-United Slates v. Jenkins, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 431 
(1979) (criticizing Court of Appeals' decision on facts in United States v. Vinson, where district 
court had admitted evidence wilh a limiting instruction, and jury might infer that declarant had 
told driver-defendant of her plans, which would show he committed perjury when he said he did 
not know of lhem). 
107 See United Slates v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1493 n.4 (lOlh Cir. 1993) ("An out-of-court 
slatement relating a third party's slate of mind falls outside lhe scope of lhe hearsay exception 
because such a slatement necessarily is one of memory or belief. "). 
108 ALASKA R. EVID. 803(3); accord MD. R. EVID. 5-803(b)(3) ("The following are not 
excluded by lhe hearsay rule, even lhough lhe declarant is available as a witness: . .. A slatement 
of lhe declarant's lhen existing slate of mind [or] emotion ... (such as intent, plan, motive, 
design, [and] mental feeling ... ), offered to prove lhe declarant's lhen existing condition or the 
declarant's future action .... " (emphasis added»; see Slate v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 634, 
642-43 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (finding no error in admitting, under Alaska R. Evid. 803(3), wilh 
a limiting instruction, testimony lhat murder victim had said she planned to meet lhe defendant 
"near lhe King Crab Cannery at 9:00 p.m. lhat evening"; slatements were properly admitted "to 
prove lhat she intended to meet [lhe defendant] at lhe King Crab Cannery lhat evening," but were 
inadmissible to prove lhat defendant intended to be at lhe cannery); Figgins v. Cochrane, 942 
A.2d 736, 745 (Md. 2008) ("In all of lhe forward-looking uses of a present intent to prove a 
future act or to interpret a future act, lhere is lhe identity of person between lhe hearsay declarant 
and lhe future actor. Allhough some slates permit a declarant's slatement of intent to prove not 
only lhe declarant's future action pursuant to lhat intent but lhe future action of anolher person as 
well, Maryland does not."); Johnson v. Slate, 381 A.2d 303, 305, 307-09 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1977) (holding harmless error to admit proof against defendant lhat his codefendant in felony 
murder and attempted robbery case had said, prior to lhe crime, lhat '''he was going to pick up 
[defendant] and make some money'''). 
109 See Slate v. Via, 704 P.2d 238 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that, in an action alleging kidnapping 
and murder, lhe declarant's note lhat he intended to meet a man at Denny's about real eslate was 
relevant to show that was lhe purpose, in lhe declarant's mind, for lhe meeting: "The purpose of 
lhe exception is 'to render slatements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future 
conduct, not lhe future conduct of anolher person.'" (citing FED. R. EVID. 803 historical note». 
110 See State v. MacDonald, 598 A.2d 1134, 1135 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991), where lhe court 
required a hearing outside lhe jury's presence on whelher to admit testimony that lhe murder 
victim had told several people lhat she was going to meet lhe defendant to pick up a videolape 
and lhat lhe defendant "wanted to see her on Sunday evening ... to give her a videolape." The 
court explained: 
Mindful of lhe possible prejudicial impact of lhe victim's alleged slatements, lhe 
Court nevertheless believes that [Del. R. Evid.] 803(3) encompasses such 
slatements within its scope. . .. Such evidence would be admissible to show lhe 
victim's present purpose or intention when lhe slatements were made and to 
prove, by inference, her future conduct. Such evidence would not be admissible 
to show, inferentially, lhe intent or future conduct of lhe defendant, in my view. 
[d. at 1140. The court noted: 
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Tennessee,llS and Texas,1l6 as well as Australia1l7 and the District of 
A limiting instruction substantially in the following fonn would, in the Court's view, 
be appropriate, assuming the admissibility of the statements: 
"Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: Statements of the deceased, Julie Spencer, 
have been allowed as evidence in this trial. You are instructed that this testimony 
is to be considered by you only in connection with evaluating the present purpose 
or intent of the deceased at the time when the statements were made, and its 
effect, if any, on her subsequent conduct. You are not to consider this testimony 
to evaluate the intent or conduct of the defendant, Glenn MacDonald." 
[d. at 1140 n.4; see also Derrickson v. State, 321 A.2d 497, 503-04 (Del. 1974) (holding that 
murder victim's request to employer for time off so that he could go to Delaware with defendant 
was properly admitted "to show the present purpose or intention of the deceased when the 
statement was made"). 
111 See People v. Silvestri, 500 N.E.2d 456, 459-60 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that a murder 
victim's statement that she was '''supposed to meet [her] husband on the 13th floor at 10:00 
o'clock [sic]''' was properly admitted under the state of mind exception: "A decedent's hearsay 
statement is admissible, for example, to show his intent to accompany defendant someplace or to 
prove that he did so, but is not admissible to show any intent on the part of defendant to go 
someplace."); People v. Jones, 406 N.E.2d 112, 113-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that 
statements by one murder victim to his wife and by the other victim to his brother that they were 
meeting the defendant to purchase a car were properly admitted "to show the decedents' intent to 
meet with the defendant"); People v. Reddock, 300 N.E.2d 31, 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (holding 
that murder victim's statements to his sister were properly admitted "to show his intent to 
accompany the defendant in viewing the land and that he, in fact, left home on that ostensible 
mission. The testimony does not show, nor would it be competent to show any intent on the part 
of the defendant to look at the land or to set out upon such a trip."); see also Johnson v. Chrans, 
844 F.2d 482,485 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that application of Illinois law, which does not admit 
out-of-court statements regarding the declarant's state of mind as proof of subsequent conduct by 
a person other than the declarant, did not violate defendant's due process rights). The facts of 
Jolmson v. Chrans, however, involved a Shepard-type backward looking statement. See supra 
notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
112 See People v. Atwood, 154 N.W. 112, 115-17 (Mich. 1915) (finding that evidence was 
admissible to show declarant's intention to meet defendant and "her purpose in going away," but 
not that she met him). 
113 See State v. Farnam, 161 P. 417, 422 (Or. 1916) (Harris, J., concurring) (stating that 
victim's statement to her friend, that she would not go home with her that evening because she 
thought the defendant was "coming down," was admissible in trial for attempt to commit an 
unlawful abortion which resulted in victim's death; stating further that evidence was admissible 
to show victim's intent, not defendant's, and a limiting instruction could have been appropriate on 
request; concluding that even if admission had been error, it was harmless, as evidence was 
cumulative of evidence not objected to). 
114 See Comrrwnwealth v. Henderson, 472 A.2d 211 (Pa Super. Ct. 1984), where the court 
held it was proper to admit murder victim's statements that he intended to visit defendant on the 
day of his murder: 
The objected to testimony merely established that it was the decedent's intent to meet 
with the appellant on June 3, 1981 in connection with the sale of the decedent's 
automobile to the appellant. The testimony does not establish that he went to the 
appellant's residence but that he merely intended to do so. Independent testimony 
established that the decedent was at the appellant's house on June 3, 1981. We are 
convinced that the testimony falls clearly within the "state of mind" exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
[d. at 214-16 (footnote omitted). 
115 See Kirby v. State, 17 Tenn. 383 (1836) (reversing murder conviction because trial court 
improperly admitted statement of victim that went beyond stating his intent to go on journey and 
included his intent to go with defendant). 
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Columbia, 118 have followed this rule in their case law. 
Those jurisdictions following the House Report's restriction reason 
that the circumstantial guarantees of reliability supporting the state of 
mind hearsay exception exist only when one speaks of one's own intent. 
Certainly, this hearsay exception bears no circumstantial guarantee of 
sincerity .119 Experience tells us, for example, that the declarant may be 
concocting a "cover story" for his or her true intentions, or falsely 
boasting of a relationship with the other person. But the state of mind 
hearsay exception is based, rather, on the fact that one has no problems 
of perception or memory when one speaks of one's own state of 
mind. 120 Yet when one speaks of another's intent, even if one is 
sincere, there is perforce a perception problem (How is one to know 
what is someone else's intent or state of mind?) and a memory problem 
(whatever information one has must have been obtained before one 
made the statement). 121 
Due to the added hearsay dangers of perception and memory when 
one speaks of another's intent, these jurisdictions admit forward-looking 
116 See Nguyen v. State, No. 14-97-01324-CR, 2000 WL 674894, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. May 
25, 2000) (not designated for publication) (finding no error in allowing murder victim's 
roommate to testify, under Tex. R. Evid. 803(3), that "he overheard a phone conversation 
bctwccn [victim] and [defendant] in which [vidimJ agreed to meet [defendant] at a specific gas 
station": "[Victim's] statements simply reflect his intention to meet [defendant] at the gas 
station"); Norton v. State, 771 S.W.2d 160, 166-68 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that wife's 
testimony that murder victim, her husband, told her of his intention to go to defendant's shop was 
admissible to prove victim's intent, but wife's testimony that defendant had called and asked 
victim to come was inadmissible; reversible error to admit latter part of testimony, which was not 
cured by limiting instruction). 
117 Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 (Aust!.); see Tapper, supra note 86. 
118 See Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21, 24, 26-30 (D.C. 1980) (finding reversible error to 
admit murder victim's statements that the defendant "had requested to see her the next morning at 
Federal City College"). The Clark court stated: "We accept the approach taken in the House 
Report not only because it admits statements of intention consistent with the standards applied to 
the admission of other state-of-mind evidence, but also because the declarant's statements, if 
reliable at all, are only reliable as to the declarant's own intention." Id. at 30. 
119 See, e.g., Duvall v. Hambleton & Co., 55 A. 431, 433 (Md. 1903) (holding testimony that 
deceased had said she expected to loan another person $5000 and that he was to assign her certain 
stock was inadmissible hearsay-her self-serving declaration was offered in her own favor); see 
also supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra note 107; cf Herman v. Oehrl, 82 A. 161, 162 (Md. 1911) (finding decedent's 
statement that she was leaving house where she boarded to go with plaintiffs because they were 
going to take care of her in exchange for her house was properly excluded when question was not 
decedent's intention in leaving, but whether she had entered into contract on which plaintiffs 
sought recovery). As philosopher Stuart Hampshire explained: 
When we see a man acting, we normally see a whole performance in a standard social 
setting, not simply a set of physical movements. But the performance may be 
contrived to conceal feeling and intention, and we may not see through the 
performance to the feelings and intentions that in such a case will be said to lie "behind 
it." 
STUART HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION 78 (New ed. 1982). 
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statements of intention only to prove the declarant's subsequent acts, 122 
which requires that the declarant's acts be both relevant and III 
question. 123 
In the typical homicide case, for example, the victim's state of 
mind and her own subsequent acts are usually irrelevant. 124 What is in 
question, rather, is only the defendant's conduct: Did the defendant 
murder her?125 Her statement, "I'm afraid of Defendant," though it 
describes her state of mind, would ordinarily be relevant only to prove 
that the defendant had done something in the past to put the victim in 
fear, which in tum would make it more likely that he had hurt her this 
time as well. It thus would be offered for a "backward-looking" initial 
purpose and would be inadmissible under Shepard, as codified in Rule 
803(3).126 But a particular defense may make relevant the victim's 
post-statement conduct in accord with her self-proclaimed state of mind. 
122 E.g., Kirkland v. State, 540 A.2d 490, 492-93 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (holding 
declarant's statement of intent admissible as circumstantial evidence of his later completing the 
intended act). 
123 See, e.g., Md. Paper Prods. Co. v. Judson, 139 A.2d 219, 226 (Md. 1958) (holding 
reversible error to refuse to admit deceased wife's testimony that, on morning of fatal accident, 
deceased had told her that he intended to stop on the way to work to pick up a gear wheel to be 
used in one of defendant-employer's machines; evidence was admissible to show that deceased 
was acting in course of employment at time of accident); Tittlebaum v. Penn. R.R., 174 A. 89, 90-
91 (Md. 1934) (finding it proper to admit testimony of one boy that companion had picked up 
brick and said he was going to "bust a window," and that witness saw companion throw brick in 
direction of passing train, to show that brick broke window on train, even though witness did not 
see where brick struck); Bait. & O. R. Co. v. State ex rei. Chambers, 32 A. 201, 202 (Md. 1895) 
(holding decedent's declaration of intention of going to Washington was admissible to show that 
he had right to be on defendant's property and to take particular route, on his way to defendant's 
ticket office); Cooke v. Cooke, 43 Md. 522, 532-33 (1876) (fmding that statements of declarant's 
fraudulent intent were admissible); Kirkland, 540 A.2d at 492-93 (holding proper to have 
admitted what was inferentially defendant's out-of-court statement that he "'was going to kill this 
[victim] if he didn't have [his] money by a certain time"'; "the statement was admissible under 
any of three theories: (1) as a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule; (2) as circumstantial 
evidence of declarant's subsequent conduct; and (3) as an admission [of a party opponent] under 
an exception to the hearsay rule"); Sobus v. Knisley, 273 A.2d 227, 231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1971) (holding that, in negligence action by plaintiff who, like defendant, could not remember 
collision or events of few moments preceding, testimony of policeman that plaintiff had told him 
of his intention to take certain route was admissible to show that plaintiff subsequently took that 
route); see also supra notes 45, 83-84. See generally 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 
46, § 275; IA JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 112 (Peter 
Tillers rev., 1983); Hutchins & Siesinger, supra note 57; John MacArthur Maguire, The Hillmon 
Case-Thirty-Three Years After, 38 HARV. L. REv. 709 (1925). 
124 See, e.g., Stoll v. State, 762 So. 2d 870,872-75,877 (Fla. 2000) (finding victim's state of 
mind not relevant in instant case). See generally Paul Rice, The State of Mind Exception to the 
Hearsay Rule: A Response to "'Secondary' Relevance," 14 DUQ. L. REv. 219 (1975); David 
Eckersley, Note, Relative Relevance-A Limitation on the Use of State of Mind Testimony in 
Homicide Prosecutions, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 85. 
125 See Stoll, 762 So.2d at 878 (noting prosecution's closing argument as to import of victim's 
statements). 
126 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 
48-50,81-83 and accompanying text. 
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If the defendant pursues a claim of self-defense and offers testimony 
that the victim attacked him--or a defense of accident and offers 
testimony, for example, that the victim invited him into her home on the 
date of the charged homicide-the victim's post-statement conduct 
becomes relevant, and the prosecution may prove that prior to that date, 
she had said, "I am afraid of Defendant." 127 Under these circumstances, 
the evidence is relevant to help to prove that she was in fear of the 
defendant, and thus she was unlikely either to seek him out to attack 
him or to invite him into her home. 128 
A victim's statement of intent may also sometimes be relevant to 
the defendant's motive to commit a crime against her. If her following 
through with her stated intent would create a motive for the defendant to 
harm the victim, the victim-declarant's forward-looking statement is 
relevant to prove her subsequent conduct, which is now material to the 
case. 129 This situation often arises when the victim's statement of intent 
involves future action intended to be taken toward the defendant, such 
as "I'm going to kick Defendant out of the house," or "I'm going to 
break up with Defendant," which is offered to show the victim's likely 
subsequent conduct and its effect on the defendant. 130 
The Hillmon doctrine is most pristinely applied in situations such 
as these, when the relevance of the declarant's intended conduct is clear, 
and that conduct would have required no cooperation of the third person 
127 State v. Parr, 606 P.2d 263, 267 (Wash. 1980). The Washington Supreme Court explained: 
[I]fthere is no defense [in homicide cases] which brings into issue the state of mind of 
the deceased [victim], evidence of fears or other emotions is ordinarily not relevant. 
But where a defense such as that of accident or self-defense is interposed ... , courts 
have generally allowed the admission of evidence of the victim's fears, as probative of 
the question whether that person would have been likely to do the acts claimed by the 
defendant .... 
/d.; accord State v. Porter, 587 A.2d 188, 191 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990); see also Clark v. United 
States, 412 A.2d 21, 26-29 (D.C. 1980) (finding evidence inadmissible under facts of case). 
128 See, e.g., Case v. State, 702 A.2d 777 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (holding that, when 
murder defendant's defense was that the victim had invited him into her home and that the gun 
went off by accident, trial judge properly admitted the victim's out-of-court statements of her fear 
of the defendant as relevant to whether victim had invited him in and voluntarily positioned 
herself close enough to him that she could be accidentally shot; holding further that evidence of a 
domestic violence protective order that prohibited the defendant from entering the victim's home 
was properly admitted for this purpose). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249-50 (M.D. Ga. 2006) 
(admitting murder victim's statement under Rule 803(3) that she was going to talk to defendant 
about obtaining military benefits for herself and their unborn child); Gray v. State, 769 A.2d 192, 
209-15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (fmding that out-of-court statements of murder victim that she 
intended to tell defendant, her husband, that she wanted a divorce, were properly admitted to 
prove that she did tell him, which was relevant to his motive; fmding further that corroborating 
evidence of trustworthiness of out-of-court statement is not required by MD. RULE 5-803(b)(3)), 
rev'd on other grounds, 796 A.2d 697 (Md. 2002). 
130 See supra note 129. But cf State v. Weedon, 342 So.2d 642, 647 (La. 1977) (holding 
reversible error to permit testimony that the murder victim said she intended to leave her husband 
the following morning, after he left on a trip, when "she planned to leave secretly"). 
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(in these examples, the criminally accused). 131 Where the other 
person's cooperation would be required, however-as where the 
declarant states an intention to meet the other person at a prearranged 
time and place 132-is where the jurisdictions diverge. If the declarant's 
conduct is not in issue, those jurisdictions following the House Report 
exclude the evidence. 133 
Where the declarant's conduct is itself relevant to the case, the case 
law in these jurisdictions permits admitting the declarant's statement, 
but with a limiting instruction under Rule 105 134 that it must be 
considered only to prove the declarant's intent and not that of the other 
person. 135 Here some bleed-over is natural 136 in that the fact-finder will 
be hard-pressed to follow the limiting instruction. 137 Nevertheless, as 
131 Examples of such uses may be found in the facts of United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 
842-43 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Boyer Chern. Lab. Co. v. Indus. Cornm'n, 10 N.E.2d 389 (Ill. 
1937) (finding employee's statement that he intended to call on several druggists was admissible 
as part of the res gestae); Carter v. State, 501 N.E.2d 439, 441-42 (Ind. 1986) ("The statement 'he 
would have to check with his brother, Charles Carter, to see if [cocaine] was available' is also 
hearsay; however, it falls under the state of mind exception because it is introduced to show [the 
declarant's] intention to do a future act, namely to telephone appellant."); supra note 85. 
132 See, e.g., State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 634 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
MacDonald, 598 A.2d 1134, 1140 n.4 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991); Johnson v. State, 381 A.2d 303, 
305,307-09 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); State v. Farnam, 161 P. 417, 422, 426-30 (Or. 1916) 
(Harris, J., concurring); see also supra notes 108, 110, 113. 
133 See supra notes 104, 106-08, 115. 
134 See FED. R. EVID. 105 ("When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon 
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."). See 
generally 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 275; I WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, §§ 
105.01-105.04. 
135 See, e.g., Gray v. State, 769 A.2d 192,209-15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (affirming trial 
court's admission of evidence and giving of limiting instruction to consider it only as to 
declarant's intent and declarant's subsequent conduct), rev' d on other grounds, remanded, 796 
A.2d 697 (Md. 2002); Johnson v. State, 381 A.2d 303, 308 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (finding 
declarant's statements of plan were not admissible against nondeclarant); see also supra notes 
108,110,112-13. 
136 See State v. Via, 704 P.2d 238, 251 (Ariz. 1985) (finding hearsay statements admissible, 
under ARIZ. R. EVID. 803(3), when "they primarily relate to the declarant's state of mind": 
"Insofar as the statements in this case had some bearing on the issue of defendant'S conduct and 
whereabouts, however, they were nevertheless admissible." (emphasis added»; see also supra 
note 110. 
137 See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103-04 (I933). The Court reasoned: 
[T]he accusatory declaration ["Dr. Shepard has poisoned me"] must have been rejected 
as evidence of a state of mind, though the purpose thus to limit it had been brought to 
light upon the trial. The defendant had tried to show by Mrs. Shepard's declarations to 
her friends that she had exhibited a weariness of life and a readiness to end it, the 
testimony giving plausibility to the hypothesis of suicide. By the proof of these 
declarations evincing an unhappy state of mind, the defendant opened the door to the 
offer by the government of declarations evincing a different state of mind, declarations 
consistent with the persistence of a will to live. The defendant would have no 
grievance if the testimony in rebuttal had been narrowed to that point. What the 
government put in evidence, however, was something very different. It did not use the 
declarations by Mrs. Shepard to prove her present thoughts and feelings, or even her 
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long as the evidence is probative of the declarant's conduct, which is 
important to the case, the evidence will not be excluded by the hearsay 
rule. \38 If the declarant's conduct is amply proved by other evidence, 
however, judges in the jurisdictions that follow the House Report's 
restriction should exercise their discretion to exclude the evidence under 
Rule 403 because the risk of the jury's using it to prove the defendant's 
conduct substantially outweighs any probative value it will add as to the 
victim's conduct. 139 
thoughts and feelings in times past. It used the declarations as proof of an act 
committed by some one else, as evidence that she was dying of poison given by her 
husband. This fact, if fact it was, the government was free to prove, but not by hearsay 
declarations. It will not do to say that the jury might accept the declarations for any 
light that they cast upon the existence of a vital urge, and reject them to the extent that 
they charged the death to some one else. Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the 
compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those accusatory words would 
drown all weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our 
rules of evidence are framed. They have their source very often in considerations of 
administrative convenience, of practical expediency, and not in rules of logic. When 
the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes 
out. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord United States v. Kaplan, 510 F .2d 606, 609-11 & 
n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding limiting instruction ineffective, and holding admission of evidence 
reversible error); State v. Farnam, 161 P. 417, 432 (Or. 1916) (Burnett, 1., dissenting) ("The sole 
purpose of putting in evidence her unwarranted remark that she thought Roy was coming, and the 
only way the jury must have understood it, was to allow them to infer that he had written her he 
was coming, and ... to presume that he did come .... "). 
138 See People v. Atwood, 154 N.W. 112 (Mich. 1915), where the Michigan Supreme Court 
held it was proper to admit, as part of the res gestae in an unlawful abortion trial, the testimony of 
a witness that the victim had said she was "going for a walk with [defendant]" and that defendant 
"was out waiting for her." /d. at 113. The court asserted, without mention of a limiting 
instruction having been given: 
We are of opinion that it was competent to prove her utterances made when she was 
leaving home, and the neighbor's home, on Tuesday evening, not as evidence of the 
fact that she met respondent, but as evidence of her intention to meet him and 
explanatory of her purpose in going away. . .. Whether they truthfully explained her 
conduct and purpose was a question for the jury. 
/d. at 117. 
139 The advisory committee's note to Rule 105 provides: 
A close relationship exists between this rule and Rule 403 which [provides for] 
exclusion when "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." The present rule recognizes 
the practice of admitting evidence for a limited purpose and instructing the jury 
accordingly. The availability and effectiveness of this practice must be taken into 
consideration in reaching a decision whether to exclude for unfair prejudice under Rule 
403. In Bruton v. United States, the Court ruled that a limiting instruction did not 
effectively protect the accused against the prejudicial effect of admitting in evidence 
the confession of a codefendant which implicated him. The decision does not, 
however, bar the use of limited admissibility with an instruction where the risk of 
prejudice is less serious. 
FED. R. EVID. 105 advisory committee's note; see United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 879-87 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903,909-11 (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("While, 
strictly speaking, Jones' statements are not sought to prove Layton's conduct, the danger that the 
jury will make a highly prejudicial leap is certainly present."), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 720 
F.2d 548; State v. Magruder, 765 P.2d 7\6,720 (Mont. 1988) (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (discussing 
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In direct OpposItIOn to the approach followed by these 
jurisdictions, many other courts reject the House Report's limitation and 
apply Hillmon to freely admit those statements to prove the 
nondeclarant-accused's post-statement conduct. 140 
B. The No Holds Barred Approach 
Case law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit; 141 the United States District Courts for the Northern District of 
Iowa 142 and the District of Massachusetts; 143 arguably, the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia; 144 and the states of 
Alabama,145 Arkansas,146 Connecticut,147 Georgia,148 Kansas, 149 
dangers because Rule 803(3) was approved to render statements of intent by the declarant, not the 
future conduct of another, admissible); Norton v. State, 771 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. App. Ct. 
1989). John MacArthur Maguire argues: 
It seems a proper conclusion that the Hillman doctrine as to the relevancy of mental 
state fails to cover the proof of any situation not at least partially attributable to the acts 
of the declarant, and that it will be applied hesitatingly and only after cautions to the 
jury in the proof of situations which must be the joint product of the acts of the 
declarant and others. If a line of cleavage comes here, it is reasonably sure to be 
jagged and irregular. No simple formula can solve all variations. It will be necessary 
to consider the amount of cooperation required from the other person involved by the 
declarations; the difficulty or ease of obtaining from him such cooperation; the 
emotional or other impulses tempting the triers of fact to swallow the declarations 
whole; and sundry additional matters peculiar to each case. 
Maguire supra note 123, at 719; see also 5 WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, § 803.05[2][c], at 803-35 
to -37 (discussing exclusion of such evidence under Rule 403); Tapper, supra note 86, at 462 
(criticizing Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 (Aust!.), which admitted state of mind 
evidence, ostensibly for the limited purpose of proving the declarant's conduct, when the 
declarant's state of mind was not really at issue); Wiseman, supra note 58, at 703-05. 
140 See infra Part III.B. 
141 See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 375-80 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that trial court 
admitted proof of kidnapping victim's statements of intent to meet defendant and instructed jury 
that the evidence was admitted only to show declarant's state of mind; finding, on appeal, no 
error, even assuming that evidence was admitted to prove defendant's actions); see also infra 
notes 158-75 and accompanying text. 
142 See United States v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 2d 939, 959-60, 963-64 (N.D. Iowa 2005) 
(finding admissible evidence that murder victim had said he was "going to meet [defendant],,), 
afJ'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 495 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 32 
(2008). 
143 See United States v. Houlihan, 871 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding decedent's 
statement that he was going out to meet "Billy Herd" admissible against codefendant Herd). 
144 See United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249-50 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (admitting, 
pursuant to Rule 803(3), murder victim's statements over telephone that she was with the 
defendant, that they were on their way to get her a car in Columbus, and that they would then 
return home). In this author's opinion, however, because the statement in Natson as to the 
presence of the defendant would qualify as a present sense impression under Rule 803(1), the 
case does not clearly support admitting the statement under Rule 803(3) to prove the defendant's 
whereabouts. 
145 See Thornton v. State, 45 So.2d 298,300-02 (Ala. 1950) (holding that statements of murder 
victim to wife that he was going to defendant's home in order to retrieve the money he had loaned 
2010] "I'M GOING TO DINNER WITH FRANK" 399 
defendant was properly admitted as part of the res gestae: "the act of beginning or contemplating 
the trip or journey"); Zumbado v. State, 615 So.2d 1223, 1226-27, 1235-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1993) (finding that apparent murder victim's statements to his brother that he was selling all his 
property to defendant and going to Costa Rica to work for defendant were properly admitted and, 
in any event, evidence was cumulative of other evidence not objected to). 
146 See State v. Abernathy, 577 S.W.2d 591 (Ark. 1979) (en banc), in which the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held it was reversible error to grant defense's motion in limine to preclude 
testimony that murder victim "had expressed her intention to see [the defendant] on the preceding 
night, before her death." Id. at 592. The court, making no mention of any proffer by the 
prosecution of corroborating evidence, asserted: 
[T]he trial court should have sustained the admissibility of [the victim's] statement that 
she was going to meet [the defendant] that night. That statement falls within 
[Arkansas] Rule 803(3) and is in fact similar to the proof found admissible in Hillman. 
That the statement may also show that [the defendant] was going to meet [the victim] 
does not, under the majority view, render it inadmissible. 
Id. at 593. 
147 See State v. Santangelo, 534 A.2d 1175 (Conn. 1987). In Santangelo, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting "testimony of the [murder] 
victim's husband and daughter relating to conversations they had with the victim concerning her 
intention to meet [the defendant] at the Chatham Pharmacy on September 10 and accompany him 
to ajob interview." Id. at 1183-84. The court asserted: 
[The defendant] contends ... her statements that she was going to meet [the defendant] 
pertain, not only to her intention, but to those of another person, i.e., [the defendant]. 
He argues, therefore, that the victim's husband and daughter should not have been 
allowed to testify as to whom the victim said she was to meet, because for that purpose 
her statements were inadmissible hearsay. We are unpersuaded. The hearsay 
statements of an unavailable declarant, made in good faith and not for a self-scrving 
purpose, that express his or her present intentions to meet with another person in the 
immediate future are admissible and allow the trier of fact reasonably to infer that the 
declarant's expressed intention was carried out. 
Id. at 1184; see also State v. Journey, 161 A. 515 (Conn. 1932) (holding that murder victim's 
statement on morning of his death that he was going to work for defendant, and testimony that he 
walked off in direction of defendant's business, was properly admitted to show that victim "was 
in the company of the accused on the morning in question"). 
148 See Smith v. State, 96 S.E. 1042, 1042 (Ga. 1918) (affirming admission of murder victim's 
statement to his wife that he was "going over to the hollow to hide a still; him and [defendant and 
others]"); cf Thomas v. State, 67 Ga. 460, 463-64, 1881 WL 3408, at *1 (1881). In Thomas, the 
Georgia Supreme Court held: 
The sayings of the murdered woman on the night of the homicide when in the act of 
leaving the house to which she never returned, and a short time before the homicide, 
that "there are two persons down the alley; I think it is [the defendant] and his 
sweetheart; I will go down and see," were admissible as part of the res gestae, which is 
the transaction which began in her leaving the house in search of the prisoner and 
culminated in her assassination where she expected to find him. . .. The remark 
accompanied her act in leaving and her purpose to see the defendant on an errand of 
jealous anger; it was so near the fatal rencontre as to preclude the thought of plan or 
device to utter a falsehood. 
/d. at *3. Although cited in People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 & n.4 (N.Y. 1999), when 
discussing jurisdictions which have applied the Hillman doctrine in a manner that allows 
"statements of a declarant's intention to perform acts entailing the participation jointly or 
cooperatively of the nondeclarant accused," in the author's opinion, this statement is better 
analyzed as a combination of her present sense impression under Rule 803(1)-that it was 
defendant-and then under Rule 803(3) of her own intent to go down the alley, which required no 
other person's cooperation. 
149 See State v. McKinney, 33 P.3d 234,243 (Kan. 2001) (holding that the victim's "statement 
to his uncle, Jimmy Spencer, that Les wanted to talk to [the victim] and he was going to see what 
400 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
Maine,150 Mississippi,151 Nevada,152 New Jersey,153 North Carolina, 154 
South Carolina,155 Virginia,156 and Washington 157 has freely admitted, 
Les wanted" was properly admitted under the state of mind hearsay exception: "The statement is 
important because it connects the defendant to Spencer's testimony that indicated the Les to 
whom the statement referred to in the plan to lure [the victim] out of the house was the 
defendant."), overruled on other grounds, State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317 (Kan. 2006). 
150 See State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019, 1026-29 (Me. 1977) (holding that the state of mind 
exception is broad enough to admit information involving the future actions of nondeclarants; 
finding that statements by the victim that he and the defendant were going to take a trip to buy 
hashish and that the defendant was armed were admissible under the state of mind exception; 
rejecting the argument that the trial judge's limiting instruction would have been ineffective; and 
reasoning that: "The Hillman Court conceived the scope of the 'present state of mind' hearsay 
exception as broad enough to encompass the admissibility of so much of the declarant's plan to 
take future action as included the involvement of other persons in the plan."), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774 (Me. 1985). 
151 See Bogan v. State, 754 So.2d 1289, 1290, 1293-94 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming that 
murder victim's statement to his girlfriend that he intended to pick up "Jerry" (defendant's first 
name), on his way to work was properly admitted pursuant to MISS. R. EVID. 803(3): "By its 
terms, the rule does not limit the class of person's [sic] statements of intent may be admitted 
against."). 
152 See Lisle v. State, 941 P.2d 459, 467 (Nev. 1997) ("Pursuant to Hillmon and [NEV. REv. 
STAT.] 51.105(1) [the state of mind exception], the district court did not err by allowing 
[victim's] statement" that he was going with "Vatos" to get drugs, "to be admissible as direct 
evidence that he did, indeed, carry out that intent and go with 'Vatos."'). 
153 See State v. Thornton, 185 A.2d 9 (N.J. 1962), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held: 
[W]hen [the murder victim], in effect, told her cousin, a few hours before she was shot 
[at the apartment where the husband was living], of her intention to visit [the 
defendant], her husband, [because she thought he was ill], the statement was a perfectly 
natural incident of the conversation. It related to the then existing state of her mind; it 
was made in the ordinary course of a conversation as the usual type of information she 
might communicate to her cousin; and the circumstances were such as to exclude 
suspicion of an intention to make evidence to be used at a trial. 
!d. at 14-17; Hunterv. State, 40N.J.L. 495, 540(1878) (dictum). 
154 See State v. Coffey, 389 S.E.2d 48,58-59 (N.C. 1990) (holding murder victim's statements 
that she was going to "go fishing with 'a nice gray-haired man'" were admissible under N.C. R. 
EVID. 803(3»; State v. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d 442, 450-52 (N.C. 1988) (holding victim's 
statement of intention to go to North Carolina with defendant was admissible); State v. Vestal, 
180 S.E.2d 755, 768-73 (N.C. 1971) (finding no error in permitting widow to testify as to her 
husband's (the victim'S) plans that he was going on a business trip with the defendant: "It is 
competent evidence indicating that for such purpose [the victim] reached and entered into the 
company of [the defendant] on the night the State's evidence tends to show he was killed in 
[defendant's] warehouse."). 
155 See State v. Griffm, 528 S.E.2d 668, 669-70 (S.C. 2000) (holding that testimony that 
murder victim had hung up the phone and said "he 'had to meet [the defendant] and someone 
else' who wanted to buy two or three pounds of marijuana" was properly admissible under Rule 
803(3); holding in addition that it was merely cumulative). 
156 See Hodges v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 680, 683, 693-94 & n.14 (Va. 2006) (holding 
that murder victim's statement to her babysitter that she was going to meet defendant '''down the 
dirt road past his house'" on the day of her disappearance was properly admitted, as it made it 
'''more probable that she indeed met him there"'). 
157 See State v. Terrovona, 716 P.2d 295,299-300 (Wash. 1986). The Washington Supreme 
Court, asserting that "[m]ost courts have expanded the 'Hillman doctrine' to admit hearsay 
statements of intent that implicate a third party's conduct," held: 
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under the state of mind hearsay exception, statements of the declarant's 
intent, such as "I'm going to dinner with Frank tonight," to prove the 
nondeclarant's (here, Frank's) subsequent conduct, and has done so 
without mentioning any requirement of corroboration of the 
nondeclarant's intent or conduct. The decision by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pheaster 158 
exemplifies this approach. 
Hugh Pheaster and Angelo Inciso were tried for and convicted of 
conspiracy to kidnap and hold for ransom sixteen-year-old Larry Adell, 
whose whereabouts were unknown at the time of trial. 159 The district 
court admitted, over Inciso's objection, testimony by two of Larry's 
friends that on the evening of his disappearance, Larry had said that "he 
was going to meet Angelo at Sambo's North at 9:30 [p.m.] to 'pick up a 
pound of marijuana which Angelo had promised him for free,'" and that 
when he left the table at Sambo's at 9: 15 p.m., he said "he was going to 
meet Angelo and he'd be right back."160 One of the friends further 
"testified that she had been with Larry on another occasion when he met 
a man named Angelo, and she identified the defendant as that man."161 
In response to the hearsay objection regarding Larry's statements, the 
prosecutor offered the testimony "for the limited purpose of showing 
the 'state of mind of Larry. "'162 The judge overruled the objection and 
instructed the jury that it could consider the testimony only "for that 
limited purpose and not for 'the truth or falsity of what (Larry) said."'163 
[T]he [murder victim's] statements, made before leaving his house, about the phone 
call from the defendant and his intention to go help him, constituted the State's 
strongest evidence of the defendant's guilt. Neither this defendant's nor the decedent's 
states of mind were at issue in the trial. Under the "Hillman doctrine," however, the 
decedent's intentions were admissible to infer that he acted according to those 
intentions, and that he acted with the person he mentioned. The conduct of the 
decedent and the defendant after the phone call was definitely at issue in the trial. The 
decedent's statements under the circumstances here created a trustworthy inference that 
the defendant met him on I 16th Street where he was killed within a half hour of 
receiving the phone call and leaving his home. Those statements were properly 
admitted into evidence, the weight of such evidence being for the jury. 
[d., subsequent proceeding, Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that Washington state court's admission of murder victim's statement that defendant had 
just called and victim was going to meet him, to place defendant at the murder scene, fell within 
state of mind exception and was not unconstitutional). But see State v. Hart, 175 P.2d 944, 952-
53 (Wash. 1946) (finding that admission of proof of decedent's statement that she was going to 
have an abortion and that she was going to accused to have "blood clots" removed, with limiting 
instruction, was not error). 
158 United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976). 
159 [d. at 358. 
160 [d. at 375. 
161 [d. 
162 [d. at 374. 
163 [d. at 374-75. 
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On appeal, the panel majority of two, in an opinion by District Judge 
Renfrew, affirmed the convictions. 164 
The majority chose not to rely on the limiting instruction, but went 
out of its way to instead hold that, under the then-applicable common 
law (the trial took place before the effective date of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence), the statements were "relevant and admissible to show that, 
as intended, Larry did meet Inciso in the parking lot at Sambo's North 
on the evening of June 1, 1974."165 Judge Renfrew acknowledged that 
"[s]everal objections can be raised against a doctrine"166 that "requires 
that the trier of fact infer from the state of mind of the declarant the 
probability of a particular act not only by the declarant but also by the 
other person." 167 As he explained: 
One such objection is based on the unreliability of the inference but 
is not, in our view, compelling. A much more significant and 
troubling objection is based on the inconsistency of such an 
inference with the state of mind exception. This problem is more 
easily perceived when one divides what is really a compound 
statement into its component parts. In the instant case, the statement 
by Larry Adell, "I am going to meet Angelo in the parking lot to get 
a pound of grass," is really two statements. The first is the obvious 
statement of Larry's intention. The second is an implicit statement 
of Angelo's intention. Surely, if the meeting is to take place in a 
location which Angelo does not habitually frequent, one must 
assume that Angelo intended to meet Larry there if one is to make 
the inference that Angelo was in the parking lot and the meeting 
occurred. The important point is that the second, implicit statement 
has nothing to do with Larry's state of mind. For example, if Larry's 
friends had testified that Larry had said, "Angelo is going to be in the 
parking lot of Sambo' s North tonight with a pound of grass," no state 
of mind exception or any other exception to the hearsay rule would 
be available. Yet, this is in effect at least half of what the testimony 
did attribute to Larry. 168 
Although voicing these reservations, both the majority 169 and Judge Ely, 
who concurred in part and dissented in part,170 felt that precedent 
compelled the application of the Hillman doctrine to the Ph easter facts. 
164 [d. at 358. 
165 [d. at 375. The majority asserted: "Although we recognize the force of the objection to the 
application of the Hillman doctrine in the instant case, we cannot conclude that the district court 
erred in alI owing the testimony concerning Larry Adell's statements to be introduced." /d. at 380 
(footnote omitted). 
166 ld. at 376. 
167 /d. 
168 /d. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted). 
169 See id. at 377-79. The majority stated: "Despite the theoretical awkwardness associated 
with the application of the Hillman doctrine to facts such as those now before us, the authority in 
favor of such an application is impressive, beginning with the seminal Hillman decision itself." 
ld. at 377. 
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The majority argued that the possible "unreliability of the 
inference" went merely to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its 
admissibility: 
The inference from a statement of present intention that the act 
intended was in fact performed is nothing more than an inference. 
Even where no actions by other parties are necessary in order for the 
intended act to be performed, a myriad of contingencies could 
intervene to frustrate the fulfillment of the intention. The fact that 
the cooperation of another party is necessary if the intended act is to 
be performed adds another important contingency, but the difference 
is one of degree rather than kind. The possible umeliability of the 
inference to be drawn from the present intention is a matter going to 
the weight of the evidence which might be argued to the trier of fact, 
but it should not be a ground for completely excluding the admittedly 
relevant evidence. 171 
The majority thus indicated that it felt the jury could properly evaluate 
the evidence and not overvalue it. 
Yet, the case against Angelo Inciso-as opposed to his co-
defendant, Ph easter-was thin.172 As ably explained by Judge Ely, the 
key evidence against Inciso was the "Hillmon" evidence: 
In respect to Inciso's participation in the kidnapping conspiracy, 
there is no doubt that [Larry] Adell's hearsay statement that the latter 
was going to meet "Angelo" [Inciso] was the strongest evidence 
linking Inciso to the conspiracy. The statement was obviously 
relevant to Adell's state of mind and his future intent. But it was 
also highly prejudicial to Inciso. Adell's statement could not be 
admitted without the attendant and substantial risk that, despite the 
judge's limiting instruction, the jury would rely on the statement to 
prove not only the act of Adell, but also those of Inciso. 173 
Had the hearsay statements been the only evidence against Inciso, 
without any other evidence connecting him to Pheaster, this author 
believes that Inciso's conviction would have been reversed, even by the 
170 Id. at 384 (Ely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Ely explained: 
I am obligated by the almost century-old precedent of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Hillmon to concur in the majority's decision that the trial court did not commit 
reversible error in admitting Adell's alleged statement. Nevertheless, while my 
Brother Renfrew is doubtless correct that a majority of courts have adhered to the so-
called Hillmon doctrine, it is also true that the holding has been subjected to severe 
criticism by some of our Nation's most distinguished judicial scholars. I am impelled, 
therefore, strongly to emphasize my own agreement with [those critics]. 
ld. at 385 (footnote and citation omitted). 
171 Id. at 376 n.l4 (majority opinion). The majority also noted, "Our review of the record 
reveals nothing about the circumstances of the statements made by Larry to suggest any reason to 
doubt their reliability." !d. at 378 n.l7. 
172 See id. at 383 ("The evidence against Ph easter can properly be characterized as 
overwhelming .... [In contrast, a]lthough circumstantial, the evidence against Inciso is sufficient 
to support the jury verdict."). 
173 Id. at 385 (Ely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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majority, on the ground that it was not supported by sufficient 
evidence. 174 Judge Ely strenuously argued that Inciso' s conviction was 
in any event unjust, quoting California Supreme Court Justice Traynor: 
'" A declaration as to what one person intended to do ... cannot safely 
be accepted as evidence of what another probably did. '" 175 That view, 
though rejected by the Pheaster majority, was of course the one later 
adopted in the House Report on Rule 803(3).176 
Some jurisdictions take a compromise position between that of the 
House Report and that of the Pheaster majority. They condition the 
admissibility of such statements as Larry's in Pheaster against the 
accused on the admission of corroborating evidence that the 
nondeclarant (there, "Angelo") named in the declarant's forward-
looking statement took the action that the declarant prognosticated. 177 
C. Jurisdictions that Condition Admissibility on Corroborating 
Evidence 
State courts in New York l78 and Ohio l79 and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,180 have explicitly stated that 
they will not approve the admission of statements like "I'm going to 
meet Angelo" to prove that the declarant met up with "Angelo," unless 
there is corroborating evidence of "Angelo's" actions. Indeed, 
although in adopting the broad admissibility approach in Pheaster l81 the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on the leading California 
case, People v. Alcalde,182 the Alcalde court may be seen as following 
(albeit not explicitly) this less radical approach of requiring 
corroborating evidence before admitting a forward-looking statement to 
help to prove a nondeclarant's subsequent conduct. 
174 See id. at 383 (majority opinion) (summarizing evidence connecting Inciso to Pheaster 
during time of charged kidnapping); id. at 379 (pointing out that the Alcalde "court also noted 
that there was other evidence from which the defendant's guilt could be inferred"). 
175 !d. at 385 (Ely, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting People v. Alcalde, 
148 P.2d 627,633 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., dissenting)). 
176 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra Part lILC. 
178 See People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052, 1055-61 (N.Y. 1999). In upholding the conviction 
of a police officer for peIjury in connection with an investigation into cheating on a police 
department exam, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed admission under the state of mind 
hearsay exception of a recorded conversation between two of the defendant's friends. The 
conversation concerned a meeting during which the defendant and his friends were to obtain the 
answers to the exam. The court held that the statement in question met the following necessary 
foundational requirements: 
(I) the declarant is unavailable; (2) the statement of the declarant's intent 
unambiguously contemplates some future action by the declarant, either jointly with 
the nondeclarant defendant or which requires the defendant's cooperation for its 
accomplishment; (3) to the extent that the declaration expressly or impliedly refers to a 
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1. Alcalde 
In Alcalde, a murder victim's roommate and brother-in-law each 
testified that the victim had told them on the day of her murder that she 
intended to have dinner with "Frank" that evening. 183 The next 
morning, her beaten body was found in a field alongside a country 
road. 184 Unlike in Hillman, where the declarant's whereabouts were the 
key question,185 in Alcade, there was no question at trial as to the 
declarant's whereabouts. The only possible relevance of the victim's 
statements was to place Florencio "Frank" Alcalde with her on the night 
of her murder. 186 
prior understanding or arrangement with the nondeclarant defendant, it must be 
inferable under the circumstances that the understanding or arrangement occurred in 
the recent past and that the declarant was a party to it or had competent knowledge of 
it; and (4) there is independent evidence ofreliability, i.e., a showing of circumstances 
which all but rule out a motive to falsify, and evidence that the intended future acts 
were at least likely to have actually taken place. 
Id. (citations omitted), habeas corpus denied, No. 99 Civ.8796 (RMB), 2002 WL 31426266 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002). Note that in People v. James, the statements also should have been 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as statements by coconspirators during and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. In People v. Malizia, 460 N'y.S.2d 23, 27 (App. Div. 1983), the New York 
appellate court asserted: 
We are persuaded that a statement by a deceased that he intends to meet another is 
admissible where the statement is made under circumstances that make it probable that 
the expressed intent was a serious one, and that it was realistically likely that such a 
meeting would in fact take place. 
!d., ajJ'd, 465 N.E.2d 364 (N.Y. 1984). 
179 See State v. Allen, No. 1814, 1990 WL 40197 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1990) (unreported). 
The court held: 
[The defendant's girlfriend's statements that she and defendant] intended to procure 
three pounds of marijuana to sell later that night are admissible against [the defendant] 
as proof that later that evening he obtained and sold three pounds of marijuana. The 
Hillman state of mind exception has been expanded to include statements of a 
declarant's intention to do a subsequent act with a third person to prove that the third 
person participated in the subsequent act when there is independent evidence that 
corroborates the declarant's statements. 
!d. at *4. 
180 See infra Part III.C.2. 
181 United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353,378-89 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra Part III.B. 
182 People v. Alcalde, 148 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1944) (in bank). 
183 Id. at 628. 
184 [d. at 627. 
185 See supra notes 60-61, 70-89 and accompanying text; seli also infra note 210 and 
accompanying text. 
186 Alcalde, 148 P.2d at 633 (Traynor, J., dissenting). Justice Traynor reasoned: 
Since the evidence is overwhelming as to who the deceased was and where she was 
when she met her death, no legitimate purpose could be served by admitting her 
declarations of what she intended to do on the evening of November 22[n]d. The only 
purpose that could be served by admitting such declarations would be to induce the 
belief that the defendant went out with the deceased, took her to the scene of the crime 
and there murdered her. 
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The trial court had admitted the victim's statements, but advised 
the jury that they were "admitted for the limited purpose of showing the 
decedent's intention."187 Justice Shenk, writing for the California 
Supreme Court majority of five that affirmed Alcalde's conviction and 
death sentence,188 characterized the victim's statements as follows: 
Her utterance was hearsay. It was made extrajudicially and offered 
as proof of the truth of its content. It was a declaration of intent to 
do an act in the future, offered as evidence that the deceased had the 
intent she declared and that the intent was probably carried out, 
namely, that she intended to and did go out that night with a man 
named "Frank." 189 
The California precedent cited by the majority was not directly on 
point, as those cases involved facts where the declarant's subsequent 
act, not a third person's, was at issue. 190 Therefore, in extending the 
hearsay exception so as to prove acts of the third person, Justice Shenk 
relied instead on Hillmon and on the New Jersey decision in Hunter, 
which had been cited with approval in Hillmon, as well as in Minnesota 
and Utah cases. 191 He stated: "In other jurisdictions cases are found 
which recognize the admissibility of declarations of intent to go to a 
certain place or with a certain person in the future." 192 
Interestingly, neither any of the cited cases nor the facts of Alcalde 
(where there was a great deal of corroborating evidence of the 
defendant's guilt) 193 support reading it as setting forth the no-holds 
barred approach to admissibility for which it was relied on by the Ninth 
Circuit when it adopted that approach in so many words in Ph easter. 194 
The Utah case cited by the Alcalde majority provides no support 
for extending the hearsay exception to prove a third person's intent and 
subsequent conduct. The Utah court approved the admission of a 
murder victim's statement of intent to go to the defendant's house; the 
statement did not purport to predict or describe the defendant's 
!d. 
187 !d. at 630 (majority opinion). 
188 Id. at 627,633. 
189 !d. at 63l. 
190Id. 
191 Id. 
192 !d. (citing Hunter v. State, 40 NJ.L. 495 (1878); State v. Hayward, 65 N.W. 63 (1895); 
State v. Mortensen, 73 P. 562, 568-70 (1903)). 
193 See infra text accompanying notes 221-22. 
194 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Pheaster, 544 
F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), in which the Ninth Circuit asserted: 
Despite the theoretical awkwardness associated with the application of the Hillmon 
doctrine to facts such as those now before us, the authority in favor of such an 
application is impressive, beginning with the seminal Hillmon decision itself. . .. The 
Hillmon doctrine has been applied by the California Supreme Court in People v. 
Alcalde, a criminal case with facts which closely parallel those in Hunter. 
Id. at 377-78 (citation omitted). 
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movements. 195 Accomplishment of the victim's intended conduct 
would not have required the defendant's cooperation. 196 Moreover, the 
defendant had admitted that the deceased had come to his house,197 so 
the victim's statement was not needed to place the victim and the 
defendant together. 
Hayward, the Minnesota case cited in Alcalde, approved the 
admission of the murder victim's statement that she had a business 
engagement with the defendant, but again, the defendant's conduct was 
also proved by independent evidence: An accomplice testified that he 
and the defendant subsequently met the victim at an appointed place. 198 
The Minnesota court 199 in tum had relied on a Wisconsin case,200 which 
held that evidence that the deceased (alleged to have died as a result of 
an illegal abortion at the hands of the defendant) had said she was going 
to the defendant's house had been properly admitted to show she did go 
there201-the same purpose as in the Utah case: to prove the declarant's 
subsequent actions, independent of the defendant's. 202 
The Alcalde majority also cited with approval People v. Fong 
Sing, 203 a decision of the intermediate California appellate court, as 
holding admissible "a declaration of intent to go to a certain place."204 
Yet that case supports a conclusion directly contrary to that reached in 
Alcalde, as the intermediate court in Fong Sing affirmed the trial court's 
exclusion of a third person's statement, which had been offered by the 
defendant. The appellate court reasoned: 
[S]ince the rule constitutes an exception to the general rule excluding 
the admission of hearsay testimony, it must, of course, be confined in 
its application strictly to the circumstances or conditions giving rise 
to the reason for the recognition of that class of testimony as a legal 
method of proving a fact, and hence we do not believe that the scope 
of the rule can reasonably be so far extended as to justify the 
admission in evidence of the declaration of a third party to the 
defendant in either a criminal or civil action involving a request by 
the former that the latter go to some particular place, unless such 
declaration is accompanied or followed by a declaration by the party 
himself that he intends to go to such place. Therefore, referring to 
the present case, the fact that Gong Sue might have requested Charlie 
Suey to go to the lumber yard and get some lumber, of itself, or in 
195 State v. Mortensen, 73 P. 562, 568-70 (Utah 1903). 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 131-32. 
197 Mortensen, 73 P. at 568-70. 
198 State v. Hayward, 65 N.W. 63, 65 (Minn. 1895). 
199Id. 
200 State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299, 306-07,1877 WL 3579, at *3 (1877). 
201 Id. 
202 See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text. 
203 People v. Fong Sing, 175 P. 911 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918). 
204 People v. Alcalde, 148 P.2d 627,631 (Cal. 1944) (in bank). 
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the absence of some statement by the defendant in response to such 
request indicating his intention to accompany Suey to the lumber 
yard, would not be admissible. The rule contemplates some 
utterance by the party to the action himself, and not that of a third 
party, for the very obvious reason that the declaration is admissible 
only because it is supposed to be expressive of what is in the 
declarant's own mind with respect to the intention as to his 
destination, which, manifestly, could not be determined from what 
some other person might have said, unconnected with any 
declaration in that particular by the party himself.205 
Hunter, the New Jersey case cited in both Alcalde206 and 
Hillman,207 provides the strongest support for the Alcalde holding, but 
like Alcalde, it was a case in which there was substantial independent 
evidence of the nondec1arant's intent or conduct. Hunter approved the 
admission of the victim's statements to his wife and son that he was 
going to Camden (a New Jersey city) with the defendant. 208 Chief 
Justice Beasley, writing for the New Jersey court, analyzed these 
statements as "part of the res gestae," as they "can reasonably be said to 
be component parts, or the natural incidents of the act of the deceased in 
going to Camden .... "209 Yet again, the defendant's acts were proven 
by independent evidence, as well: Another witness testified that he 
heard the defendant offer to go with the deceased that evening.210 The 
New Jersey appellate court also held that, even if admitting the 
deceased's statements had been error, it was harmless. 2l1 
Hillman's language, literally, was of the same import as that of 
Alcalde, Hayward, and Hunter. But both parties in Hillman agreed that 
the nondec1arant-Hillmon-had gone to Crooked Creek, so that part of 
the questioned evidence did not harm the opposing party-Mrs. 
Hillmon-whose concern would have been with keeping out any 
evidence tying Walters to Crooked Creek. 212 Alcalde's defense, on the 
other hand, was an alibi: He testified not to have met the victim and to 
have been elsewhere on the night of her murder. 213 Given his alibi 
defense, the victim's statements inculpated him by placing them 
together on the night of his murder, which fact was critical to the 
205 Fang Sing, 175 P. at 913-14 (emphasis added). 
206 See supra text accompanying note 192. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. 
208 Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495, 538 (1878). 
209 Id. at 537. It should be noted that the appellate record is unclear as to whether the victim's 
body was found in Camden. See id. at 496-97 (describing how the defense attacked the 
indictment on the ground that it implicitly averred that the victim had died both in Pennsylvania 
and in New Jersey). 
210 Id. at 540-41. 
211 Id. at 542-43. 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
213 People v. Alcalde, 148 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Cal. 1944) (in bank). 
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prosecution. But there was substantial independent evidence of 
Alcalde's guilt: (1) physical evidence that he had been at the crime 
scene; (2) evidence that his car had been seen there; and (3) testimony 
(a) to his own inculpatory statements before the murder, (b) to his 
father's offering to bribe two witnesses to give false alibi testimony, and 
( c) to facts contradicting his exculpatory statements after the murder. 214 
In affirming the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements, 
the Alcalde majority referred to a general proposition that "the existence 
of a person's design or plan to do a certain thing is relevant 
circumstantially to show that he did it, and may be evidenced by his 
assertion of present intent when made in a natural way and not under 
circumstances of suspicion .... "215 The requirement that the evidence 
not be shown to have indicia of insincerity is consistent with the case 
law regarding the narrower, traditional common law state of mind 
hearsay exception216 (stemming from the early res gestae exception)217 
that is unambiguously codified in Rule 803(3).218 Within the paradigm 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may accomplish this same 
result by exercising its discretion to exclude an apparently insincere 
state of mind statement under Rule 403 on the ground that the probative 
value of an apparently insincere statement is substantially outweighed 
by the risk that its admission will result in unfair prejudice. 219 The 
214 /d. at 627-30. 
215 /d. at 632. 
216 See supra notes 46,119, 153. 
217 See supra notes 77,131,138,145,148. 
218 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
219 See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needles presentation of 
cumulative evidence."). For cases decided under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see, for example, 
United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 105-07 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding no abuse of discretion to 
exclude defendant's statement, made at some time during alleged corruption conspiracy, to 
person he apparently believed was F.B.I. agent, that defendant would not tolerate corruption); 
United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (fmding no abuse of discretion to 
exclude exculpatory statements made by defendant to person he suspected was cooperating with 
legal authorities); United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d 575, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no abuse 
of discretion to exclude defendant's letter offered by him to show his state of mind, when, inter 
alia, circumstances indicated that he had had time to "think long and hard before drafting the 
letter"); United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (fmding no abuse of 
discretion to exclude proof of accused's post-arrest statements made to his attorney because 
accused "had a chance for reflection and misrepresentation in making the proffered statements"). 
Cj United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262, 264 (D. Md. 1977) (dictum) (noting that out-of-
court statements that "at least impliedly refer to past, present, and future events" may be 
admissible; testimony by defendant's wife that her husband and his co-defendant informed her 
that a transaction was '''none of the governor's business,'" that governor would be "shocked" if 
he were to learn of it, and that it was to be kept a secret, was excluded pursuant to Rule 403 
because the evidence lacked the circumstantial guarantees of reliability found in United States v. 
Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 376-78 (2d Cir. 1961), and the need for it was not overwhelming; the 
court noted that it would be admissible under Rule 803(3) to show that they subsequently kept it a 
secret from the governor (emphasis added», ajJ'd in part, vacated in part, 591 F.2d 1347, 
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Alcalde majority, however, not only found the victim's statements of 
intent to have been "made in a natural way and not under circumstances 
of suspicion,"22o but also-importantly-found reliability in the 
existence of corroborating evidence. 221 Justice Shenk explained: 
No attempt need be made here to define or summarize all the 
limitations or restrictions upon the admissibility of declarations of 
intent to do an act in the future or to indicate what degree of 
unavailability [of the declarant] or corroboration should exist in 
every case. Elements essential to admissibility are that the 
declaration must tend to prove the declarant's intention at the time it 
was made; it must have been made under circumstances which 
naturally give verity to the utterance; it must be relevant to an issue 
in the case. Those qualifications are here present. The declaration of 
the decedent made on November 22[n]d that she was going out with 
Frank that evening stated a present intention to do an act in the 
future. Certainly it was a natural utterance made under 
circumstances which could create no suspicion of untruth in the 
statement of her intent. It did not necessarily refer to the defendant 
as the person named. But the defendant was called "Frank" as a 
nickname and he registered as Frank at the hotel where he lived. The 
defendant admittedly had been entertaining the decedent. Manifestly 
that fact, together with other corroborating circumstances, bore 
directly on the question of the relevancy of the declaration. 
Unquestionably the deceased's statement of her intent and the logical 
inference to be drawn therefrom, namely, that she was with the 
defendant that night, were relevant to the issue of the guilt of the 
defendant. But the declaration was not the only fact from which an 
inference could be drawn that the deceased was with the defendant 
that night. Other facts were in evidence from which the inference 
could reasonably be drawn. The cumulation of facts corroborative of 
the guilt of the defendant was sufficient to indicate that the trial 
court did not err in admitting the declaration. 222 
Justice Traynor, joined by Justice Edmonds, would have reversed 
Alcalde's conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting 
the victim's statements, as they did not fall into the state of mind 
exception. 223 He agreed that corroboration was required for 
admissibility, but even then he would admit such evidence only to prove 
the declarant's own subsequent acts: 
A declaration of intention is admissible to show that the declarant 
did the intended act, if there are corroborating circumstances and if 
conviction ajJ'd by equally divided court on reh'g en bane, 602 F.2d 653 (4th CiT. 1979). See 
generally supra note 135. 
220 Alcalde, 148 P.2d at 632. 
221 [d. 
222 [d. (emphasis added). 
223 /d. at 633 (Traynor, J., dissenting, joined by Edmonds, J.). 
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the declarant is dead or unavailable and hence cannot be put on the 
witness stand. A declaration as to what one person intended to do, 
however, cannot safely be accepted as evidence of what another 
probably did. The declaration of the deceased in this case that she 
was going out with Frank is also a declaration that he was going out 
with her, and it could not be admitted for the limited purpose of 
showing that she went out with him at the time in question without 
necessarily showing that he went with her. . .. Such a declaration 
could not be admitted without the risk that the jury would conclude 
that it tended to prove the acts of the defendant as well as of the 
declarant, and it is clear that the prosecution used the declaration to 
that end. There is no dispute as to the identity of the deceased or as 
to where she was at the time of her death. Since the evidence is 
overwhelming as to who the deceased was and where she was when 
she met her death, no legitimate purpose could be served by 
admitting her declarations of what she intended to do on the evening 
of November 22[n]d. The only purpose that could be served by 
admitting such declarations would be to induce the belief that the 
defendant went out with the deceased, took her to the scene of the 
crime and there murdered her. Her declarations cannot be admitted 
for that purpose without setting aside the rule against hearsay. 224 
411 
The House Report to Rule 803(3) adopts Justice Traynor's approach,225 
but the Second Circuit has followed the Alcalde majority instead.226 
2. The Second Circuit 
In United States v. Best, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the admission against Best, under Rule 803(3), 
of "a codefendant's out-of-court statement that the codefendant intended 
to ask Best to create a fraudulent document."227 In an opinion by Judge 
Kearse, the panel explained: 
In several cases, this Court has discussed whether a declarant's out-
of-court statement of intent was admissible in evidence against a 
person other than the declarant. In each of these cases, we concluded 
that admissibility turned on whether there was independent evidence 
224 Id. (citations omitted). 
225 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
226 See infra Part III.C.2. 
227 United States v. Best, 219 F.3d 192, 195-96 (2d Cir. 2000). The court described: 
Id. 
Over Best's objection, [an employee] further testified that when he reported to [Best's 
co-defendant the vice-president of finance's] refusal to implement the Medicare 
reallocation without written instructions, "[the co-defendant] told [the witness] that he 
would call Albany and talk to Jim [Best] and take care of it with the Albany division." 
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that connected the declarant's statement with the non-declarant's 
activities. 228 
The panel continued: 
In United States v. Cicale, for example, the declarant on several 
occasions told an undercover agent that he was about to meet with 
his drug "source," to whom he never referred by name, at specific 
locations such as "the guy's house" or "at the restaurant where he's 
at" "right now." Soon after each such statement, the declarant was 
either seen with Cicale or seen arriving at Cicale's home. We 
concluded that the observations of Cicale meeting with the declarant 
promptly after the declarant stated he was about to meet with his 
"source" were independent evidence that Cicale was the "source" 
referred to by the declarant and that Cicale had engaged in narcotics 
trafficking. 
Following the reasoning of Cicale, we held in United States v. 
Sperling that a declarant's statement that she was going to meet with 
her drug source at noon that day was admissible to prove Sperling's 
participation in a drug conspiracy where law enforcement agents 
observed Sperling meeting with the declarant at the appointed time, 
and no one else met with the declarant from 11 :30 a.m. to 2 p.m. In 
United States v. Delvecchio, an informant stated that he was going to 
meet with defendants Delvecchio and Amen to set up a drug 
transaction. A meeting ensued, and law enforcement agents 
observed Amen drive to the meeting site and get out of the car and 
approach the informant. However, the passenger in the car never got 
out and the agents could not see his face. We held that the 
informant's statement was not admissible to prove that Delvecchio 
attended the meeting because there was no independent evidence 
that he had done so. 
Corroboration of the nature of the transaction need not be 
eyewitness observations and may be provided by circumstantial 
evidence. Thus, in United States v. Badalamenti, the declarant stated 
that he would meet the defendant at a particular time and place to 
obtain a heroin sample; we held that there was sufficient 
corroboration to admit that statement against the defendant in light of 
the government's evidence that the defendant met the declarant at the 
location specified in the declarant's statement and that after the 
meeting, the declarant had samples of heroin. 
In the present case, there was ample circumstantial evidence to 
corroborate the proposition that Best was the person Maciejewski 
said he would ask to prepare a Medicare reallocation memorandum 
for the Company's Albany division. Best's name is James, and 
228 /d. at 198 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Delvecchio, 816 
F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1325 (2d Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Badalamenti, 794 F.2d 821, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Sperling, 726 
F.2d 69, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1982)}. 
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Maciejewski said he would call "Jim"; Best and Maciejewski were 
friends, permitting the inference that it was not improbable that 
Maciejewski would refer to Best by nickname; and Maciejewski said 
he would have "Jim" take care of the matter with respect to the 
Albany division, and Best was in charge ofthe Albany division. 
There was also ample independent proof that Maciejewski 
thereafter made such a request of Best. The record included 
evidence that Maciejewski made his statement to Gastle in early 
May; that Maciejewski thereafter wrote a memorandum on May 6 
instructing Voss to make the fraudulent reallocations with respect to 
the Buffalo division; that on May 13, Maciejewski met with Best; 
and that Best, within a day or two of meeting with Maciejewski, 
wrote a memorandum to Voss with respect to the Albany division 
that was in substance identical to the memorandum written by 
Maciejewski. Best's conduct was proven not by Maciejewski's 
statement of what he would ask Best to do, but rather by the direct 
evidence of what Best did. We see no error in the district court's 
admission of Maciejewski's statement against Best. 229 
413 
Judge Kearse's opinion thus adopts and strongly asserts a rule in the 
Second Circuit conditioning admissibility of Hillman-type statements 
against a nondec1arant on the admission of corroborating evidence. 230 
229 Id. at 198-99 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
230 Best itself stands for this proposition, although its support in prior Second Circuit cases is 
considerably thinner than it might appear from Judge Kearse's opinion. Indeed, the Cicale case 
cited by Judge Kearse in the passage quoted in the text does not support Best's holding, as the 
Cicale court did not reach the question of admissibility against the nondeclarant. Cicale involved 
the admissibility of a coconspirator's (Messina's) statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to an 
undercover agent. United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1982). Cicale argued that 
there was insufficient evidence of his participation in the conspiracy to admit, against Cicale, 
Messina's many inculpatory statements regarding Messina's ability to provide heroin. !d. at 97-
102; see United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) (establishing the Second Circuit's 
Geaney standard for admission of an alleged coconspirator's statements against another as a 
conspirator). 
Judge Winter, writing for a majority of two on this point, held that Messina's statements to 
the agent regarding Messina's going to see his "source" for the heroin were admissible only 
against Messina under Rule 803(3), and their use was not necessary to satisfy the burden needed 
to show that Cicale was a participant in the conspiracy: 
Under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), hearsay statements reflecting a declarant's intentions or 
future plans are admissible to prove subsequent acts. Were Cicale's participation in 
these acts proven only by such hearsay statements, a difficult issue would arise since 
the legislative history of Rule 803(3) in the House indicates an intent to prevent use of 
a declarant's statements as to future intentions to prove the acts of a third person. This 
would force us to join the debate about the merit and present vitality of Mutual Life 
Insurance v. Hillman. We need not enter that debate, however, which is fully explored 
in 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence P 803(3)(04)-(05) (1981), for, 
while Messina's statements prove the nature of the transaction he was planning, 
Cicale 's participation in that transaction is proven by independent evidence . 
. . . Here, while Messina's statement indicates that he is about to engage in an 
illicit drug transaction involving another, Cicale's involvement is proven by 
independent non-hearsay evidence. That the nature of the transaction necessarily 
entailed the involvement of third parties surely does not limit use of Messina's 
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, applying the rule as stated in Best, denied the government's in 
limine motion to admit testimony to the statement of a homicide victim, 
Masella, that "he was travelling to or was then located in, Brooklyn," 
for a meeting with "Steve," when offered to prove what Steve did. 231 
As explained by District Judge McKenna: 
statements to prove Messina's own acts. Statements by the declarant that he intends to 
carry out a plan are clearly admissible under 803(3), and, if a third party's 
participation is proven by independent evidence, the Hillmon issue does not arise. 
Cicale, 691 F.2d at 103-04 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). 
District Judge Ward, dissenting from this part of the opinion, would have squarely 
addressed the Hillmon issue and would have held that Messina's statements regarding meeting his 
"source" were inadmissible against Cicale under Rule 803(3); he thus would have remanded for 
the trial judge to consider whether the evidence-absent those statements-was sufficient to 
prove Cicale's participation in the conspiracy. Id. at 107, 110 (Ward, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Judge Ward wrote: 
Rule 803(3) makes declarations of intention admissible to prove only the declarant's 
future conduct, and not (as had been allowed, prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, under the doctrine set forth in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon) to 
prove the future conduct of another person. Under Rule 803(3), then, while Messina's 
six statements to Garcia were arguably admissible, with a limiting instruction, against 
Messina ... they remained inadmissible hearsay as to Cicale. 
/d. at 109 (footnote and citations omitted). 
Judges Winter and Ward agreed that the Second Circuit had previously "declined to rule 
whether Rule 803(3) limits" the Hillmon doctrine on this point. Id. at 104 (majority opinion); id. 
at 109 n.2 (Ward, 1., dissenting) (citing United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 43 n.12 (2d Cir. 
1978); United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 82 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanchich, 
550 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 n.! (2d Cir. 1977)). 
The other cases cited in Best-United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1325 (2d Cir. 
1987); United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Badalamenti, 794 F.2d 821, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1986); and United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 
73-74 (2d Cir. !984)--were also conspiracy cases. 
Badalamenti provides little support for Best, as the Badalamenti court explicitly pointed 
out that the trial judge there had stated that he was admitting an informant's statement that he was 
going to meet a codefendant (who pled guilty during the trial) to obtain heroin only to show the 
informant's "own future intent"; there was independent evidence that the appellant-codefendant 
met the informant, which then, the government argued, "linked" the statement to that defendant's 
conduct. Badalamenti, 794 F.2d at 825-86. The court of appeals upheld the district court's ruling 
and the resulting conviction. 
Nersesian, Delvecchio, and Sperling provide stronger support for Best. They involve the 
question of whether there was adequate substantive proof "by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence independent of hearsay utterances" of a nondeclarant defendant's participation in the 
charged conspiracy. Sperling, 726 F.2d at 73-74. In Sperling, the evidence that a declarant had 
said she was going to meet her heroin "source" was held properly considered on this fact because 
there was independent corroborating evidence. Id. Nersesian and Delvecchio both stated that 
"declarations of intention or future plans are admissible against a nondeclarant when they are 
linked with independent evidence that corroborates the declaration." Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 
1325; Delvecchio, 816 F.2d at 862-63 (holding evidence inadmissible in absence of independent 
evidence that Delvecchio participated in the meeting declarant had said he attended). But, in the 
end, these cases seem to conflate Rule 803(3) and Rule 801(d)(2)(E) analyses. But see infra note 
233. 
231 United States v. Paloscio, No. 99 CR. 1199 (LMM), 2002 WL 1359723, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 21, 2002) (unpublished). 
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The government's position [was] that Masella's "statements can be 
utilized to prove not only that Masella acted in conformity with his 
own intentions-that he in fact went to Brooklyn to meet 'Steve' to 
pick up money-but also as proof that the person believed by 
Masella to be 'Steve' in fact met Masella in Brooklyn."232 
415 
Judge McKenna found insufficient admissible, independent 
evidence that "Steve" or someone posing as "Steve" had met 
Masella.233 For that reason, he held that "the Masella statements are 
admissible under Rule 803(3) to prove [only] that Masella intended to, 
and did, go to Brooklyn, but not that he intended to, or did, meet 
'Steve. "'234 
This compromise approach to resolution of the Hillman third-
person debate-admitting the evidence to help to prove the 
nondeclarant-accused's subsequent conduct only if there is 
corroborating evidence of that conduct-has much to recommend it in 
terms of fairness to both parties. The prosecution does not suffer the 
loss of often invaluable and irreplaceable evidence, which the restrictive 
House approach would deny it. 235 And the requirement of significant, 
232 !d. at *2. 
233 Id. at *2-3. Judge McKenna asserted: 
[T]he government argues that the Court can consider [inadmissible hearsay] in 
connection with the issue of the admissibility pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) of the 
Masella statements at issue, because "in considering whether proffered evidence is 
admissible, the Court is not bound by the Rules of Evidence and may consider hearsay 
evidence in making preliminary determinations as to admissibility." 
The government's argument, however, misconceives the requirement of Best. 
Best, and the cases which it follows, do not require a preliminary determination of 
some fact (e.g., the existence of a conspiracy as a condition to the admission of 
coconspirator statements) as a condition to the admissibility of a statement under Rule 
803(3). The case law, rather, requires corroboration by "independent evidence." That 
evidence may be "circumstantial," but there is no indication in the cases that the 
corroboration required by Best can be supplied by inadmissible evidence known to the 
Court but not the jury. 
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). 
234 Id. at *3. 
235 See Mut. Life Ins. Co. ofN.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 296 (1892) ("Wherever the bodily 
or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such 
feelings are original and competent evidence. Those expressions are the natural reflexes of what 
it might be impossible to show by other testimony. If there be such other testimony, this may be 
necessary to set the facts thus developed in their true light, and to give them their proper effect. 
As independent, explanatory, or corroborative evidence, it is often indispensable to the due 
administration of justice. Such declarations are regarded as verbal acts, and are as competent as 
any other testimony, when relevant to the issue. Their truth or falsity is an inquiry for the jury." 
(quoting Travellers' Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Mosley, 75 U.s. 397, 404-405 (1869))); see also 
Zumbado v. State, 615 So.2d 1223, 1235 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (prosecutor referred to "Fatal 
Journey Doctrine"); State v. Vestal, 180 S.E.2d 755, 769 (N.C. 1971) (necessity established by 
death of declarant); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 275 ("[I]n virtually all the 
cases admitting the statements of intent as proof of the doing of the intended act, the declarant has 
been unavailable, and it may well be that the resulting need for the evidence influenced the 
courts .... "); McFarland, supra note 86, at 56 (arguing that declarant's unavailability should be 
required for admissibility of Hillmon-type statements); supra note 57. 
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corroborating evidence ensures against the possible conviction of an 
accused on too slim a record. But before embracing the Second 
Circuit's compromise, one must consider whether it will survive 
constitutional scrutiny. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ApPROACH TO 
ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE AGAINST A NONDECLARANT ACCUSED, AND A 
PROPOSED REVAMPING OF THAT ApPROACH UNDER A NEWLY 
INVIGORATED DUE PROCESS REVIEW 
The first issue that must be explored--one that appears not to have 
been raised in the case law thus far-is the Second Circuit's 
consideration of corroborating evidence in determining the reliability, 
for the purpose of admissibility, of a statement under Rule 803(3). This 
was unconstitutional, pre-Crawford, under the Supreme Court's 1990 
holding in Idaho v. Wright. 236 Wright was decided under the 
Confrontation Clause framework that had been established in 1980 in 
Ohio v. Roberts. 237 
If hearsay is offered against a criminal accused today, Crawford 
and its progeny govern the Confrontation Clause analysis. 238 They 
subject only "testimonial" hearsay to Confrontation Clause scrutiny.239 
Post-Crawford, the Confrontation Clause poses no bar to the admission 
against a criminal defendant of nontestimonial hearsay. 240 The 
remaining constitutional parameters as to all evidence, including 
nontestimonial hearsay, are those of the due process clause. 241 In this 
author's opinion, Wright's constraints as to how to determine reliability 
for admissibility remain until and unless Wright is overruled, but as part 
of the due process guarantee, which now assumes a much more 
prominent position than it enjoyed pre-Crawford. This author believes 
that the Second Circuit's current approach is vulnerable under Wright, 
but that the desirable aspects of the Second Circuit's approach may be 
achieved in a clearly constitutional manner either by codifying a 
requirement of corroboration in addition to reliability, or by shifting the 
corroboration requirement from the determination of admissibility to the 
determination of sufficiency of evidence at the close of the case. 242 
236 497 U.S. 805 (1990); see also infra Part IV.A. 
237 See infra text accompanying notes 243-50. 
238 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
241 See infra Part IV.B. 
242 See infra notes 319-28 and accompanying text. 
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A. Idaho v. Wright and Its Pre-Crawford Implications for the Second 
Circuit's Application of Rule 803(3) 
In Wright,243 Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of five well 
before Crawford, held that corroborating evidence could not be 
constitutionally considered in determining whether hearsay statements 
by a two-and-a-half-year-old child to a pediatrician were sufficiently 
reliable so that their admission complied with the Confrontation Clause 
analysis required by then-applicable Roberts.244 Under Roberts, 
hearsay could be admitted against a criminal accused if (I) it were 
necessary and (2) it either fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay 
exception or it bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."245 
Because the child's statement in Wright had been admitted under the 
non-"firmly rooted" residual hearsay exception of Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 803(24), its proponent had to show "particularized guarantees 
oftrustworthiness."246 The Court held that these could not be shown by 
corroborating evidence.247 
Moreover, Justice O'Connor stated that the rule precluding the 
consideration of corroborating evidence as to the admissibility of the 
hearsay was identical for both the non-firmly rooted residual exception 
and for specific, "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions.248 She reasoned: 
The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness on which the 
various specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are based are those 
that existed at the time the statement was made and do not include 
those that may be added by using hindsight. 
We think the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" 
required for admission under the Confrontation Clause must likewise 
be drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making 
of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of 
belief .... 
[W]e are unpersuaded by the State's contention that evidence 
corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may properly support a 
finding that the statement bears "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness." To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, 
243 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
244 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
245 [d. at 65-66 (holding that in order for hearsay to be properly admitted over a Confrontation 
Clause objection, necessity for the hearsay must be shown by the unavailability of the witness, 
and reliability must be shown either by the fact that "the evidence falls within a fIrmly rooted 
hearsay exception" or by "a showing ofpacticularized guarantees of trustworthiness"). 
246 Wright, 497 U.S. at 820. 
247 [d. at 820, 822-23. 
248 /d. 
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hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of 
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference 
to other evidence at trial. A statement made under duress, for 
example, may happen to be a true statement, but the circumstances 
under which it is made may provide no basis for supposing that the 
declarant is particularly likely to be telling the truth-indeed, the 
circumstances may even be such that the declarant is particularly 
unlikely to be telling the truth. In such a case, cross-examination at 
trial would be highly useful to probe the declarant's state of mind 
when he made the statements; the presence of evidence tending to 
corroborate the truth of the statement would be no substitute for 
cross-examination of the declarant at trial. 
In short, the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay 
statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would 
permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by 
bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a 
result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence 
admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that 
cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility. 
Indeed, although a plurality of the Court in Dutton v. Evans looked 
to corroborating evidence as one of four factors in determining 
whether a particular hearsay statement possessed sufficient indicia of 
reliability, we think the presence of corroborating evidence more 
appropriately indicates that any error in admitting the statement 
might be harmless, rather than that any basis exists for presuming the 
declarant to be trustworthy. 249 
Because Idaho had not argued that, if the admission of the child's 
statement were error, it was harmless, the majority reversed the 
appealed conviction without inquiring into whether the error was 
harmless. 25o But Justice O'Connor also argued that jurors might be 
unskilled in assessing the independent reliability, or lack thereof, of 
partially corroborated hearsay. She stated: 
Corroboration of a child's allegations of sexual abuse by medical 
evidence of abuse, for example, sheds no light on the reliability of 
the child's allegations regarding the identity of the abuser. There is a 
249 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). On the issue of harmless error, compare, for example, United States v. Wright, 540 
F.3d 833, 843 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that admission of child's statements to others, identifying 
defendant as her molester, was harmless even if error, where it was cumulative evidence and 
consistent with her trial testimony), with Gregory v. North Carolina, 900 F.2d 705, 707-10 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (holding reversible error for state court to have admitted inadequately corroborated 
hearsay statement by three-year-old girl made in June 1984, when defendant was charged with 
having sexually abused the girl in September 1984). But see id. at 710-11 (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that correcting holding would have been that corroborating circumstances 
need not all be "contemporaneous" with the statements). 
250 Wright, 497 U.S. at 827. 
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very real danger that a jury will rely on partial corroboration to 
mistakenly infer the trustworthiness of the entire statement. 251 
419 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White and Blackmun, strenuously dissented from the majority's holding 
precluding the consideration of corroborating evidence in evaluating the 
reliability of proffered hearsay: 
The majority errs, in my view, by adopting a rule that corroboration 
of the statement by other evidence is an impermissible part of the 
trustworthiness inquiry. The Court's apparent ruling is that 
corroborating evidence may not be considered in whole or in part for 
this purpose. This limitation, at least on a facial interpretation of the 
Court's analytic categories, is a new creation by the Court; it likely 
will prove unworkable and does not even square with the examples 
of reliability indicators the Court itself invokes; and it is contrary to 
our own precedents. 
I see no constitutional justification for this decision to prescind 
corroborating evidence from consideration of the question whether a 
child's statements are reliable. It is a matter of common sense for 
most people that one of the best ways to determine whether what 
someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other 
evidence. In the context of child abuse, for example, if part of the 
child's hearsay statement is that the assailant tied her wrists or had a 
scar on his lower abdomen, and there is physical evidence or 
testimony to corroborate the child's statement, evidence which the 
child could not have fabricated, we are more likely to believe that 
what the child says is true. Conversely, one can imagine a situation 
in which a child makes a statement which is spontaneous or is 
otherwise made under circumstances indicating that it is reliable, but 
which also contains undisputed factual inaccuracies so great that the 
credibility of the child's statements is substantially undermined. 
Under the Court's analysis, the statement would satisfy the 
requirements of the Confrontation Clause despite substantial doubt 
about its reliability. Nothing in the law of evidence or the law of the 
Confrontation Clause countenances such a result; on the contrary, 
most federal courts have looked to the existence of corroborating 
evidence or the lack thereof to determine the reliability of hearsay 
statements not coming within one of the traditional hearsay 
exceptions. . .. In sum, whatever doubt the Court has with the 
weight to be given the corroborating evidence found in this case is 
no justification for rejecting the considered wisdom of virtually the 
entire legal community that corroborating evidence is relevant to 
reliability and trustworthiness. 252 
251 Id. at 824. 
252 Id. at 827, 828-31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.l., White and 
Blackmun, JJ.) (footnote omitted). 
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Despite this strong dissent by four members of the Court, and 
considerable criticism by commentators,253 Wright has not been 
overruled. 
Where does this leave the Second Circuit's approach as articulated 
in Best? Is it constitutionally permissible for a court to condition its 
finding of reliability, and thus admissibility under Rule 803(3), on the 
existence of independent evidence corroborating the third person's 
subsequent conduct consonant with the declarant's forward-looking 
statement of intention? 
In this author's opinion, pre-Crawford,254 the Wright majority's 
rationale clearly precluded, as a constitutional matter, the consideration 
of corroborating evidence with regard to the reliability of Rule 803(3) 
253 See John J. Capowski, Statements against Interest, Reliability, and the Confrontation 
Clause, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 471,512 (1997). Capowski argues: 
Although the use of corroboration is at odds with the holding in Idaho v. Wright, the 
long tenn viability of that decision is questionable. First, Wright was a 5-4 decision, 
and two Justices from the majority have since retired. Second, "[o]ften corroborating 
evidence is strong proof of important points in a statement, and Wright's approach to 
the difficulties in this area is not promising." Third, as the dissenters in Wright argued, 
there is "no difference between the factors that the Court believes indicate 'inherent 
trustworthiness' and those, like corroborating evidence, that apparently do not." 
Fourth, earlier Supreme Court decisions had used corroborating facts in testing 
reliability. Finally, some scholars have suggested that Wright's "bar against 
considering independent corroborative evidence should be dropped." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Barbara Horan asserts: 
Hearsay offered to prove a state of mind should be consistent with external facts and 
events that are presupposed or implied by that state of mind. For example, evidence of 
a businessman's intent to interfere with a competitor's contract with his own supplier 
of cheap materials, offered in the fonn of out-of-court declarations of his desire to best 
his competitors, could can [sic] be tested against other testimony showing he was 
unfamiliar with the competitor in question. 
Barbara L. Horan, Using Hearsay to Establish State of Mind: Rule 803(3) in Action, PROOF, 
Winter 2009, at 8, II; see also Timothy W. Murphy, Corroboration Resurrected: The Military 
Response to Idaho v. Wright, 145 MIL. L. REv. 166, 167 (1994) ("Military courts, in particular, 
have aggressively sought to limit Wright's application and resurrect the use of corroborative 
evidence in assessing the admissibility of residual hearsay."). Gordon Van Kessel opines: 
[C]orroboration should not be limited by the Idaho v. Wright standard of "indicia of 
reliability by virtue of[the statement's] inherent trustworthiness." In tenns of hearsay 
reliability, it is not productive to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic 
corroborating factors. In fact, evidence extrinsic to the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statement may be stronger proof of statement reliability, and, ultimately, 
verdict integrity, than the context in which the statement was made. The statement of a 
kidnap victim describing the interior of defendant's home or of a sexual assault victim 
describing unique private physical characteristics of the accused would be highly 
reliable if the statement were proven to confonn to the actual facts and the declarant 
was shown to be incapable of knowing these facts by other means. Such probative 
hearsay should not be excluded merely because corroboration was not based entirely 
on the context in which the statement was made. 
Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented 
Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 533 (1998). 
254 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling Roberts as to "testimonial" 
statements); accord Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); see supra notes 4-5. 
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forward-looking statements of intent like those under discussion here, 
offered against a nondeclarant accused; bootstrapping their admission in 
such a way would violate the Confrontation Clause under Ohio v. 
Roberts, as applied in Idaho v. Wright. 255 In 2004, however, Crawford 
overruled Roberts' Confrontation Clause analysis and instituted a new 
paradigm under which the Confrontation Clause applies only to 
"testimonial" statements. 256 
B. Post-Crawford Implications: The Ascending Importance of the 
Due Process Clause 
How, if at all, does it matter that Wright was decided under the 
Confrontation Clause, during the reign of Ohio v. Roberts and before 
Crawford? This author concludes that it matters only as to testimonial 
statements, as these are the only ones to which the confrontation right 
now applies. 257 In the author's opinion, the lower courts properly 
continue to apply the reliability analysis of Roberts as to the 
admissibility of nontestimonial statements. 258 Thus, until and unless 
either Roberts or Wright259 is overruled as to nontestimonial statements, 
Wright also continues to be good law as to how to assess the reliability 
of non testimonial hearsay. 260 The change is that, as presaged by an 
255 The Wright majority's rationale is not limited to residual hearsay, but applies also to 
specific, firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. See supra notes 248-48 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
258 E.g., United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 287 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 1009 (2007); Albrecht v. Hom, 485 F.3d 103, 132-35 (3d Cir. 2007); United States V. 
Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2005) (Crawford "partially overruled" Roberts); Ramirez V. 
Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 695-96 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707 
(8th Cir. 2005) (applying Roberts' standard to excited utterance); United States V. Gibson, 409 
F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Crawford dealt only with testimonial statements and did not 
disturb the rule that nontestimonial statements are constitutionally admissible if they bear 
independent guarantees of trustworthiness."); United States V. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 179 (3d 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Despite the criticisms that 
Crawford and the White concurrence aim at existing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, 
Crawford leaves the Roberts approach untouched with respect to nontestirnonial statements."), 
opinion supplemented, 108 F. App'x 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Horton V. Allen, 370 F.3d 
75, 83-85 (1st Cir. 2004) (applying Roberts analysis to nontestimonial statements of declarant's 
state of mind); Capano V. Carroll, 547 F. Supp. 2d 378, 395-96 (D. Del. 2008); State v. Rivera, 
844 A.2d 191, 202 (Conn. 2004) ("[B]ecause this statement was nontestimonial in nature, 
application of the Roberts test remains appropriate."); People v. Reed, 838 N.E.2d 328, 334 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2005); Head V. State, 912 A.2d 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (applying Roberts, as urged 
by defense, but finding standard met), cert. denied, 920 A.2d 1059 (Md. 2007). But see Hodges 
V. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 680, 688-89 (Va. 2006) (finding "law of hearsay," rather than 
Roberts test, applicable to nontestimonial hearsay). 
259 See Capowski, supra note 253. 
260 See Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 132-35 (finding Wright survives Crawford as to nontestimonial 
hearsay); Capano, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 391 n.6, 395-96 (applying Wright factors in evaluating 
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important 1992 pre-Crawford concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, 
joined by Justice Scalia in White v. Illinois,261 this must now be 
accomplished under a due process lens rather than under the 
Confrontation Clause. 
In 1970, in his concurrence in Dutton v. Evans, Justice Harlan had 
said: 
The task [of examining the constitutionality of evidence rules] is far 
more appropriately performed under the aegis of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments' commands that federal and state trials, 
respectively, must be conducted in accordance with due process of 
law [than under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment). 
It is by this [due process] standard that I would test federal and state 
rules of evidence. 
[FN4.] Reliance on the Due Process Clauses would also have 
the virtue of subjecting rules of evidence to constitutional 
scrutiny in civil and criminal trials alike .... [T]he 
Confrontation Clause, which applies only to criminal 
prosecutions, was never intended as a constitutional standard for 
testing rules of evidence. 262 
Building on Justice Harlan's thoughts, Justices Thomas and Scalia, 
who were in the vanguard of the current Court's ultimate move away 
from Roberts' approach to the Confrontation Clause, straightforwardly 
asserted in White in 1992: "Reliability is more properly a due process 
concern. There is no reason to strain the text of the Confrontation 
Clause to provide criminal defendants with a protection that due process 
already provides them."263 
In 2004, Crawford finally tolled the death knell for Roberts with 
regard to its application of the Confrontation Clause. 264 Davis and 
Bockting made clear that, under the new regime, the Confrontation 
Clause applies only to "testimonial statements," i.e., those made by 
"witnesses against" the accused, within the meaning of the Sixth 
challenge to conviction in Delaware state court, in which nontestimonial Rule 803(4)-type 
statement had been admitted); State v. Hosty, 944 So.2d 255, 263 (Fla. 2006) (applying Wright to 
nontestimonial hearsay, admissible under statutory hearsay exception for reliable statements of a 
mentally disabled adult); Reed, 838 N.E.2d at 334 (applying Wright to statutory tender years 
hearsay exception for child victim's statement). But see United States v. McGrath, 39 M.J. 158, 
164-67 (C.M.A. 1994) (holding the Wright limitation does not apply when no confrontation issue 
exists); United States v. Clark, 35 MJ. 98, 107 (C.M.A. 1992) (Crawford, 1., concurring) (similar 
holding). 
261 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, 1.). 
262 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 & n.4 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnote in 
original). 
263 White, 502 U.S. at 363-64 (Thomas, 1., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
joined by Scalia, 1.). 
264 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment. 265 Justice Scalia, who authored the Court's opinions in 
Crawford and Davis, stressed that this was a corrective measure, taking 
us off the wrong path we had travelled under Roberts as to the 
confrontation right, and returning us to the framers' intended meaning 
in 1789, when the Sixth Amendment was ratified.266 
Having taken away the protective embrace of the Confrontation 
Clause as to non testimonial hearsay offered against an accused, the 
Crawford line of opinions has not yet addressed what constitutional 
safeguards, if any, remain as to the admissibility and sufficiency of such 
hearsay. We are so used to having the Confrontation Clause do the 
heavy lifting in protecting a criminal accused from the admission of 
unreliable hearsay against her that our initial reaction was one of almost 
panicked dismay: Could the Court be saying that there is no 
constitutional safeguard against the conviction of a person when based 
on unreliable nontestimonial hearsay?267 
To ask the question would seem to answer it. Could a conviction 
based on unreliable hearsay268 have been constitutionally obtained? 
Here is where Justice Thomas's concurrence in White comes to the fore: 
"Reliability is ... a due process concern"; due process provides such 
"protection" by definition. 269 
He and Justice Scalia summon us to pull the due process clause out 
into the daylight and dust it off. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No 
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .... "270 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in 
pertinent part: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process oflaw .... "271 As Justice Harlan argued, 
these clauses are well suited for examining the constitutionality of 
evidence matters, as, unlike the Confrontation Clause, they apply to 
both civil and criminal proceedings.272 
Under Crawford and its progeny, the Confrontation Clause applies 
only to "testimonial" hearsay offered against a criminal accused.273 The 
265 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
266 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,825 n.4 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
40, 42, 60-69 (2004). 
267 See supra note 24. 
268 This question assumes that the question has been preserved for appeal. See FED. R. EVID. 
103(a)(I) (need to object). It also assumes that the error is not harmless. See FED. R. EVID. 
103(a) (error will be found only if"a substantial right of the party is affected"). 
269 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.); see supra text accompanying note 263. 
270 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
271 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
272 See supra text accompanying note 262. 
273 See supra notes 4-5. 
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states are free to devise evidence rules as they like,274 but if they 
improperly admit testimonial hearsay against an accused without 
complying with Crawford's requirements, they will violate the 
confrontation right. Before Crawford, Roberts and its progeny, 
including Wright, applied equally to testimonial and nontestimonial 
hearsay. The Crawford line has pulled testimonial hearsay out from 
under the Roberts tent. Is the tent still standing as to non testimonial 
hearsay? 
The lower courts think so. They continue to apply Roberts to the 
admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay.275 Although the cases so far 
have been criminal, they (perforce of Crawford) were not decided under 
the Confrontation Clause. From where, then, comes the constitutional 
authority to support Roberts in this new iteration? The White 
concurrence tells us it is from the due process clause. 276 
Just as before Crawford, the remedy of reversal for a new trial in 
this context is generally available only if the trial court's evidentiary 
error causes "substantial prejudice" to the accused. 277 In effect, the 
appellate court looks at whether the improperly admitted evidence was 
likely to have affected the fact-finder's decision. 
There have been exceptions to this rule. Where the government's 
actions were egregious, the convictions have been reversed, regardless 
of other, even overwhelming, evidence of the defendants' guilt. The 
Supreme Court has held that the admission of a coerced (and thus 
unreliable) confession violates the accused's due process right,278 as 
does the admission of an identification of the accused obtained through 
overly suggestive methods (making it unreliable).279 The Court has also 
held that the prosecution's deliberate, knowing use of perjured 
testimony violates due process. 280 
Pre-Crawford, in the criminal context, the Confrontation Clause 
was the defense against unreliable hearsay being used against an 
accused. The due process clause was invoked only when the 
274 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at 
issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their 
development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such 
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether."). 
275 See supra note 258. 
276 See supra text accompanying note 263. 
277 See supra note 268. 
278 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993). 
279 E.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 105-06, 114 (1977) ("The standard, after all, is 
that of fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
... [R]eliability is the linch pin in determining the admissibility of identification 
testimony .... "); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1969) (unduly suggestive lineup). 
280 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 272 (1959) (false evidence); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (known peIjured testimony). 
2010] "I'M GOING TO DINNER WITH FRANK" 425 
Confrontation Clause could not be used, as in the examples given in the 
preceding paragraph. 
The appellate courts also relied on due process principles to review 
decisions in which the Confrontation Clause was altogether 
inapplicable: sentencing hearings,28I probation revocation hearings,282 
and administrative law proceedings.283 In each of these arenas pre-
Crawford case law establishes that, although hearsay may be admitted 
because the formal rules of evidence do not apply,284 the due process 
clause requires that the decisions be reversed if the fact-finder 
necessarily based its decision on unreliable hearsay. 285 
281 E.g., United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he relevant provision 
at sentencing is the due process clause, not the confrontation clause .... "). 
282 E.g., United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 342-43 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding due process 
requirement applies to probation revocation proceedings, but Crawford does not). In United 
States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (II th Cir. 1994), a pre-Crawford opinion, the court stated: 
Defendants involved in revocation proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due 
process requirements. Among these minimal requirements is the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses.... Thus, in deciding whether or not to admit 
[reliable] hearsay testimony, the court must balance the defendant's right to confront 
adverse witnesses against the grounds asserted by the government for denying 
confrontation. 
Id. at 114 (citations omitted). 
283 See infra note 285. 
284 See, e.g., In re Billy W., 875 A.2d 734, 749-51 (Md. 2005) (holding that, although the rules 
of evidence do not "strictly apply" in certain kinds of proceedings, including juvenile disposition 
and permanency planning hearings, sentencing hearings, probation revocation hearings, and 
administrative hearings, proponent must demonstrate that "evidence proffered for admission is 
sufficiently reliable and probative prior to its admission"; holding further no error in admitting 
reliable hearsay during permanency planning proceeding regarding child custody); Bethlehem 
Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, 49 A.2d 793, 798 (Md. 1946) (finding that reliable hearsay admissible 
before Workers' Compensation Commission, even ifit does not fit within a recognized exception 
to the hearsay rule); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (holding that procedural 
due process requirements in a social security disability claim hearing were not violated by 
reliance upon written reports of nontestifYing physicians, when claimant had not availed himself 
of his right to subpoena and cross-examine physicians). 
285 See, for example, Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1882-83 (II th Cir. 2008), in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the "substantial evidence" standard in 
reviewing an administrative hearing decision, and found that it was not met under the facts of the 
case. The court held: 
Although the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in administrative hearings, there 
are due process limits on the extent to which an adverse administrative determination 
may be based on hearsay evidence. As was held in u.s. Pipe and Foundry Company v. 
Webb, "hearsay may constitute substantial evidence in administrative proceedings as 
long as factors that assure the 'underlying reliability and probative value' of the 
evidence are present." The reliability and probative force of such evidence depend on 
"whether (I) the out-of-court declarant was not biased and had no interest in the result 
of the case; (2) the opposing party could have obtained the information contained in the 
hearsay before the hearing and could have subpoenaed the declarant; (3) the 
information was not inconsistent on its face; and (4) the information has been 
recognized by courts as inherently reliable." 
Id. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Robinson, 482 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2007), where 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit asserted: 
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The fact that the hearsay would not have been admissible under the 
rules of evidence applicable to trials on the merits is not sufficient to 
find it unreliable.286 In these contexts, courts have looked not only at 
the circumstances under which the hearsay statements were made, but 
also at corroborating or contradicting evidence to help evaluate both (1) 
whether the admitted hearsay was reliable, and (2) whether (a) the 
hearsay was a necessary part of the fulcrum that supported the fact-
finder's decision, or (b) even if not a necessary part, the fact-finder 
clearly relied on it, rather than on other evidence which did not suffer 
from the same unreliability.287 
Prosecutors, of course, may not introduce any and all hearsay testimony at a 
sentencing proceeding. The admission of hearsay statements in the sentencing context 
is subject to the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Under the precedent of this 
Court, hearsay statements must have some "minimal indicium of reliability beyond 
mere allegation." [United States v.] Kikumura, 918 F.2d [1084,]1102 [(3d Cir. 1990)] 
(citations omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (courts may consider any evidence at 
sentencing "provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support 
its probable accuracy"). The evidence offered by the Government through the 
testimony of Sergeant Facemyer easily passes this test. 
Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added); see Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2003) (basing verdict 
on unreliable evidence violates the losing party's due process right). In United States v. 
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained: 
In Baylin, we held [generally] that "as a matter of due process, factual matters 
may be considered as a basis for sentence only if they have some minimal indicium of 
reliability beyond mere allegation." [United States v. Baylin,] 696 F.2d [1030,] []1040 
(3d Cir. 1982) .... 
Nonetheless, we believe that the Bay tin standard is not sufficiently exacting to be 
applied in cases, such as this one, where the sentencing hearing can fairly be 
characterized as a "tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense," McMillan [v. 
Pennsylvania], 477 U.S. [79], [] 88 [(1986)]. In such a situation, we think that due 
process requires more than a "minimal indicium of reliability," Bay tin, 696 F.2d at 
1040 (emphasis added). Instead, the court should examine the totality of the 
circumstances, including other corroborating evidence, and detennine whether the 
hearsay declarations are reasonably trustworthy. 
Id. at 1102-04 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), overruled on other grounds, United States v. 
Grier, 449 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Thompson v. State, 846 A.2d 477 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2004) (reversing trial court's revocation of probation based on transcripts of witnesses' 
testimony at defendant's murder trial when State made inadequate showing of good cause to 
forego live testimony and trial court had not found the hearsay to be reasonably reliable); Travers 
v. Bait. Police Dep't, 693 A.2d 378, 386 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (noting that although the 
rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings, the evidence adduced "must 
demonstrate sufficient reliability and probative value to satisfy the requirements of procedural 
due process"); Kade v. Charles H. Hickey Sch., 566 A.2d 148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) 
(reversing agency's decision that was based on unreliable hearsay); Kurschner v. City of Camden 
Planning Comm'n, 656 S.E.2d 346,349-52 (S.C. 2008) (upholding as not violative of due process 
planning commission's decision on a matter as to which it had discretion; asserting that due 
process does not require that the hearsay rule have been applied; and upholding the standard of 
review of affirming the decision as long as there was "any evidence" to support it). 
286 See supra note 284. 
287 See, for example, Chambers v. MiSSissippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 300-02 (1973), where the 
Supreme Court held it was reversible error under due process clause to preclude defendant from 
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At the very least, this same level of due process protection must be 
provided in the criminal context. It is inconceivable that the Court 
would provide less protection to a criminal accused under the due 
process clause than to a party in a civil or administrative proceeding. 
The Court's precedent points clearly in the direction of extra 
protections, rather than fewer, for an accused. Hence the Court held in 
In re Winship that the Constitution requires that the criminal 
prosecution bear the heaviest burden of persuasion-that of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt"-in order to win a conviction.288 This burden 
reflects our judgment that we would rather err on the side of erroneous 
proving through his witnesses exculpatory hearsay statements by one witness, McDonald, against 
his own penal interest. The Court explained: 
The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and 
subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance 
of their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously to 
a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn confession, the 
testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony that McDonald was seen 
with a gun immediately after the shooting, and proof of his prior ownership of a .22-
caliber revolver and subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer number of 
independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each. 
Id. at 300 (emphasis added). See also Robinson, 482 F.3d at 246-47, in which the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the lower's court decision, stated: 
The District Court noted that [witness's] [hearsay] testimony was supported by 
audiotapes of Robinson talking with his buyers and taped sworn statements of those 
buyers admitting they purchased cocaine from Robinson on multiple occasions. 
Considering the footprint left by this evidence, the District Court's decision to allow 
the hearsay testimony was warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by 
the District Court. 
/d. Previously, in Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1103-04 & n.21, the same court, in a due process 
review of sentencing, "conclude [ d] that there [was] sufficient corroboration to establish that 
the informant's hearsay statements [were] reasonably trustworthy, and, therefore, the district 
court's consideration of the Hartman affidavit was proper." The court also noted: 
[I]n assessing reliability of a hearsay statement, the sentencing court's inquiry is not 
limited to "circumstances that surround the making of the statement," Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805 [] (1990). The Supreme Court's decision in Wright involved an 
interpretation of the confrontation clause and is thus applicable only at trial. In 
contrast to Wright, at a '''tail-which-wags-the-dog'' sentencing hearing, the court is 
free, and indeed is required, to consider other evidence that substantiates the proffered 
hearsay statement. 
Id. at 1103 n.21; see also Bailey v. State, 612 A.2d 288, 293-94 (Md. 1992) (stating that trial 
court should consider "the presence of any additional evidence which corroborates the proffered 
hearsay," in determining whether evidence is "reasonably reliable hearsay" so that it may be 
admitted at'probation revocation hearing). 
288 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), 
where the Supreme Court emphasized: 
Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence 
confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent 
embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with 
that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to 
safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, 
liberty and property. 
Id. at 174. 
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acquittals than erroneous convIctIOns. In accordance with this 
philosophy, the Court held in 1973 in Chambers v. Mississippi that a 
state's evidentiary rules precluding the accused from impeaching his 
own witness and from introducing evidence of that witness's pretrial 
statements in which he asserted his guilt of the charged crime, deprived 
the accused of his due process right. 289 
Again, in a 2006 capital case, Holmes v. South Carolina,290 the 
Court held that a state evidentiary ruling was unconstitutional. The 
South Carolina decision had precluded an accused from offering "proof 
of third-party guilt if the prosecution ha[ d] introduced forensic evidence 
that, if believed, strongly support[ed] a guilty verdict."291 Justice Alito, 
writing for a unanimous Court, quoted the Court's 1986 (Roberts era) 
decision in Crane v. Kentucky that, "'[w]hether rooted directly in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the 
Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, 
the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.""'292 Justice Alito did not 
specify on which provision of the Constitution the Holmes Court 
relied.293 But his reasoning points not only to the defendant's right to 
compulsory process to call witnesses in his own behalf, but also to due 
process. This conclusion is supported by the fact that he points out that 
the South Carolina Supreme Court found the prosecution's forensic 
evidence to be so "strong"294 that the defense's exculpatory evidence of 
a third-party's guilt had little probative value, even though the defense 
had extensively challenged the credibility of the forensic evidence. 
Thus, the state appellate court had arrogated to itself a determination of 
the credibility of the evidence, which rightfully fell to the fact-finder. 295 
That error is one implicating principles of due process. 
289 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294-303. 
290 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
291 Id. at 321. 
292 !d. at 324 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (reversing conviction of a 
sixteen-year-old who had been precluded from presenting evidence before the jury as to the 
circumstances under which his confession had been obtained, so as to impact the weight, if any, it 
should be given». 
293 See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 321 ("This case presents the question whether a criminal 
defendant's federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence rule under which the 
defendant may not introduce proof of third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic 
evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict."). 
294 Id. at 329. 
295 Id. at 330. The Court explained: 
Id. 
[W]here the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses or the reliability of its evidence 
is not conceded, the strength of the prosecution'S case cannot be assessed without 
making the sort of factual fmdings that have traditionally been reserved for the trier of 
fact and that the South Carolina courts did not purport to make in this case. 
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Pre-Crawford, the Supreme Court also relied on the due process 
clause to reverse convictions when, on the evidence presented at trial, 
no rational fact-finder could have found guilt,296 The cases did not 
involve hearsay because, at that time, Roberts ruled that ocean. But 
now that Crawford has removed nontestimonial hearsay from the reach 
of the Confrontation Clause, this due process standard must take up the 
slack. 
Indeed, this test of "no rational fact-finder" being able to find guilt 
is perfectly consonant with the existing due process standard in other 
contexts, which requires the reversal of decisions necessarily based on 
unreliable hearsay. 297 It would not be "rational" to base a decision on 
"unreliable" hearsay. 298 
One easy and familiar way for the courts to determine whether 
hearsay is "reliable" for due process purposes is to follow the approach 
they have hewn for decades: that of Roberts. Not surprisingly, then, this 
is what the lower courts are doing,299 without explicitly relying on the 
due process clause. 
This approach is consistent with early articulations of due process 
values by the Supreme Court. 300 The concept is sufficiently 
malleable301 to achieve this goal. Certainly, if an administrative 
decision based on unreliable hearsay violates the losing party's due 
process rights, so does a criminal conviction based on unreliable 
hearsay. All that we await is for the Supreme Court to explicitly hold 
that Roberts continues to apply as to what is reliable hearsay from a due 
process perspective. 
The next question will be whether Wright has legs. It was a close 
decision to begin with,302 when decided under the Confrontation Clause, 
and corroborating evidence has generally been considered when 
296 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 323 (1979) ("[T]he relevant question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . .. [The 
question of sufficiency of the evidence is] central to the basic question of guilt or innocence."); 
see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,401 (1993) (applying, again, Jackson standard to review of 
a habeas corpus petition). 
297 See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text. 
298 Cf Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990) (holding that due process clause 
did not bar prosecution's use of evidence of act as to which defendant had previously been 
acquitted, when the evidence was "at least circumstantially valuable in proving petitioner's guilt" 
of the charged crime; disagreeing with petitioner's contention that the evidence was "inherently 
unreliable"). 
299 See supra note 258. 
300 See Stein, supra note 24, at 86-87 & nn.1l5-31 ("Early on, the Supreme 
Court ... interpreted the scope of due process broadly.... Contemporary constitutional 
jurisprudence reaffirms this understanding of due process [as guaranteeing 'fundamental' 
fairness].") . 
301 See id. at 89-90, 105 (describing the due process guarantee as "a floating constitutional 
threat"). 
302 See supra notes 252-52 and accompanying text. 
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determining whether a litigant has been deprived of due process. 303 
Will the change from the application of the confrontation right to the 
application of the due process clause alter the outcome? It could. First, 
that change gives the Court a premise on which to jettison Wright 
altogether, in which case courts could condition a finding of reliability, 
for admissibility purposes, on the existence of corroborating evidence. 
Second, even if Wright is not overruled outright, but reincarnated 
in a due process context, that context changes the analysis. In a 
criminal trial, a violation of the Confrontation Clause is reversible error, 
unless the government adequately defends the verdict by persuading the 
appellate court "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."304 The pre-Crawford due 
process cases arise outside the Confrontation Clause context, and the 
burden has apparently been on the party attacking the verdict to show 
that principles of fundamental fairness have been violated. Under this 
approach, there is no error of constitutional dimension until the party 
complaining of a due process violation meets that standard. Applying 
the traditional burden allocation in due process challenges to the 
erroneous admission of unreliable, but nontestimonial, hearsay against a 
criminal accused shifts the burden to the accused. Although the accused 
retains some constitutional protection, this burden-shifting is a-
perhaps unintended---consequence of Crawford that, unless altered,305 
could result in a significant lowering of protection against unreliable 
convictions when based on nontestimonial hearsay. 306 
C. Available Choices as to the Application of Rule 803 (3), Their 
Drawbacks and Advantages, and a Proposal 
Wright's continuing viability at present means that we cannot 
properly condition a finding of admissibility of Rule 803(3) forward-
looking, nontestimonial statements as to the subsequent conduct of a 
nondeclarant on corroborating evidence, as the Second Circuit did in 
Best. 307 What alternatives as to admissibility remain? 
First, a jurisdiction could choose to follow the House Report and 
(1) exclude Hillmon-type statements, unless the declarant's conduct is 
in question; and (2) then, if it is, admit the statements only for that 
303 See supra notes 252-52, 287 and accompanying text. 
304 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967). 
305 See Stein, supra note 24 (arguing for a significant strengthening of the available 
constitutional protection as to admissibility and adequacy of evidence). 
306 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra Part III.C.2; notes 259-59 and accompanying text. 
2010] "I'M GOING TO DINNER WITH FRANK" 431 
limited purpose.308 The exclusionary rule of those jurisdictions 
following the House Report's caveat has doctrinal purity, as the 
evidence bears increased risks of misperception and faulty memory.309 
But it comes at too great a cost. It often excludes irreplaceable 
evidence310 of either dead or otherwise unavailable declarants, like the 
victim's statements regarding her plans with Frank in Alcalde, or of 
coconspirator-declarants like those in Best (who will not repeat at trial 
inculpatory statements made during and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy)311 that could reasonably be found to be highly reliable. A 
variation of the first approach is possible, but morally unacceptable: 
paying only lip service to the House approach, and letting in the 
evidence that implicates the nondeclarant when the declarant's conduct 
is not at issue, but giving a limiting instruction under Rule 105 that the 
jury may consider the evidence only as to the declarant's intent. 312 The 
limiting instruction would perforce be both intellectually dishonest and 
ineffective,313 and the result would be the same as in wide-open 
jurisdictions like the Ninth Circuit. 314 
Second, a jurisdiction might choose to explicitly apply the Ninth 
Circuit's approach in Pheaster and freely admit Hillman-type 
statements as to the nondeclarant's conducP15 Under this approach, the 
perception and memory hearsay dangers will go only to the fact-finder's 
consideration in weighing the evidence, rather than to admissibility.316 
308 See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376 n.13 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained: 
[Olne treatise states that, "Use of declarations of state of mind to prove subsequent 
conduct might, then, be limited to proof of conduct that would not have required the 
substantial cooperation of persons other than the declarant." McCormick's Handbook 
of the Law of Evidence 698 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). However, that same authority also 
recognizes that "courts have not imposed the limitation." [d. at 698-99. 
!d. The court continued: 
In his opinion for the Court in Shepard v. United States, Justice Cardozo indicated in 
dicta an apparent hostility to the Hillman doctrine. . .. In his survey of the state of 
mind exception, Justice Cardozo appeared to suggest that the Hillman doctrine is 
limited to "suits upon insurance policies," although the cases cited by the Court in 
Hillman refute that suggestion. 
[d. at 380 n.18 (citations omitted). 
309 See supra note 86. 
310 See supra notes 57,235. 
311 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986). 
312 For examples of such uses of a limiting instruction, see supra note 150 and text 
accompanying note 162. 
313 See supra note 13 7. 
314 See supra Part III.B. 
315 See supra Part III.B. 
316 See Mut. Life Ins. Co. ofN.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 296 (1892) ("Their truth or falsity 
is an inquiry for the jury."); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376 n.14 (9th Cir. 1976) 
("The possible unreliability of the inference ... is a matter going to the weight of the evidence 
which might be argued to the trier of fact .... "); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ~ 803(3){04) (1981) (expressing a preference for Maguire's rule, 
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This approach also goes too far, as it could result in such statements, 
standing alone, being considered sufficient evidence of the 
nondeclarant's conduct. 
A third option, the compromise approach currently followed by the 
Second Circuit-which conditions a finding of admissibility on the 
existence of corroborating evidence-has the desirable effects of 
retaining probative, often irreplaceable, evidence without sacrificing 
fairness to the accused. Technically, however, it does not survive 
constitutional scrutiny under Idaho v. Wright317 (although a particular 
error might be found to be harmless).318 
But the Second Circuit's approach can be modified in one of either 
two ways so as to pass constitutional muster. First, a jurisdiction could 
choose to codify a requirement for corroborating evidence in its version 
of Rule 803(3). Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Wright 
suggested that, despite the Court's ruling on the constitutional issue, a 
requirement of corroborating evidence might be added, as a matter of 
state law, to hearsay categories where a state so desired. 319 
The other possibility is to resequence the corroboration 
requirement, through the case law, by re-working the Second Circuit's 
approach into two steps. This has the practical advantage of not 
requiring approval through the rulemaking or legislative process. Under 
this alternative, the trial court's first step would be to admit a Hillmon-
type statement under Rule 803(3), regardless of whether there was 
corroborating evidence, and permit it to be used as proof of both the 
declarant's and nondeclarant's subsequent conduct, as long as it was 
made absent circumstances supporting a finding of insincerity. 320 If the 
trial court finds that nontestimonial hearsay evidence facially fits under 
a firmly rooted hearsay exception-and it finds Rule 803(3) to be such 
which allows a statement of intent to function as part of a "larger matrix of circumstantial 
evidence" (citing Maguire, supra note 123, at 717»; see also 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra 
note 6, § 801:1 (Supp. 2009) ("[O]ne legitimately may question whether modem, well-educated 
jurors are likely to overvalue hearsay .... " (citing Roger C. Park, Visions of Applying the 
Scientific Method to the Hearsay Rule, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1149»; supra notes 56, 138; text 
accompanying note 171. 
317 See supra notes 236-50, 257-59, and accompanying text. 
3 I 8 See supra text accompanying note 249. 
319 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 830-31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
White and Blackmun, n.) ("States are of course free, as a matter of state law, to demand 
corroboration of an unavailable child declarant's statements ... before allowing the statements to 
be admitted into evidence."); cf FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (conditioning the admissibility of a 
statement that is against an unavailable declarant's penal interest and that exculpates an accused 
on the presence of "corroborating circumstances clearly indicat[ing] the trustworthiness of the 
statement"). 
320 This requirement is consistent both with the common law rule, see supra note 46; text 
accompanying note 71, the res gestae cases, see supra notes 77, 138, 145, 148, and with Wright, 
which requires looking at the circumstances, including spontaneity, surrounding the making of 
the hearsay statement, Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-22. See, e.g., Capano v. Carroll, 547 F. Supp. 2d 
378, 395-96 (D. Del. 2008) (applying Wright). 
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an exception321 -under Roberts, it constitutionally may admit the 
evidence, even if the declarant is not available for cross-examination. 322 
But, under this proposed approach, such statements standing alone 
would be insufficient evidence of the nondeclarant's conduct. 323 Thus, 
at the close of the case, when the court reviews the sufficiency of the 
evidence to get to the trier of fact, the court would take the second step 
and consider the presence or absence of substantial corroborating 
evidence. 324 If there is none, the party bearing the burden of persuasion 
321 The Rule 803(3) exception goes well back to the res gestae exception of the common law 
and is generally considered "firmly rooted." Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75,85 (1st Cir. 2004); see 
supra Part II.A. Even the "forward looking," Hillmon-type use is apt to be considered firmly 
rooted. See Ph easter, 544 F.2d at 379-80 (reading the Advisory Committee note and the House 
Report to Rule 803(3) as concerning what was "perceived to be the prevailing common law view, 
namely that the Hillmon doctrine could be applied to facts such as those now before us"). If 
perchance it is found not to be "firmly rooted," an admissible statement would have to be found 
to have "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" under the circumstances under which it was 
made. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,6 (1980). 
322 See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
323 See United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that even if 
forward-looking statements were properly admitted, they "are not sufficient by themselves to 
prove" the apparently intended act; statement by kidnapper of intent to take victim out of state 
was insufficient to prove interstate transportation); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 276 
at 227, supra note 46 ("In the typical case, it is reasonable to hold that the declarations [of state of 
mind to prove subsequent conduct] are themselves insufficient to support the finding [that the 
conduct recurred] and therefore that statements of intention must be admitted in corroboration of 
other evidence to show the acts." (footnotes omitted»; Capowski, supra note 253, at 512 ("A 
corroboration requirement [for statements against interest offered by the prosecutor under Rule 
804(b)(3)] would accomplish much in assuring that only hearsay or a constitutionally-reliable 
nature is admitted against a criminal defendant."). See also Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, 
Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the 
Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REv. 149 (1995), opining: 
The trouble with hearsay is that it denies the defendant the opportunity to test the 
evidence and denies society the condition forged by that testing. To remedy this gap of 
testing and conviction, we propose an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that 
will limit the use of hearsay evidence to situations in which (1) the judge has made an 
independent foundational finding that the hearsay is competent and (2) the hearsay is 
independently corroborated. 
Id. at 173. Similarly, Van Kessel, supra note 253, argues: 
[C]orroboration and sufficiency standards should be increased to insure verdict 
integrity in light of the absence of checks on the independent and unaccountable 
factfmder. With respect to all hearsay, whether admitted under specific or residual 
exceptions, the judge should require a showing of reliability by reference to its nature, 
the circumstances of its creation, or other evidence in the case. Moreover, a 
sufficiency rule should bar convictions which are based primarily on hearsay 
statements unless they are clearly corroborated and the judge also is convinced of 
defendant's guilt. With these protections, nonadversary-created hearsay generally 
should be admitted on behalf of both the prosecution and the defense despite the 
presence of traditional declarant-oriented concerns. 
Id. at 488; see also Gray v. State, 769 A.2d 192, 214-15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) 
(distinguishing between admissibility and sufficiency), rev'd on other grounds, remanded, 769 
A.2d 697 (Md. 2002). 
324 Admitting this evidence, to contribute its probative value to the total to be considered by 
the fact-finder, is worthwhile. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987) 
("[I]ndividual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation 
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of proving the nondeclarant's conduct would have judgment entered 
against it. Because the due process clause forbids basing a verdict on 
unreliable hearsay,325 the trial court would be obligated to enter a 
judgment of acquittal in a prosecution's case, or an appellate court 
would be obligated to reverse a guilty verdict that it found was clearly 
based on unreliable hearsay. Corroborating evidence may be considered 
when evaluating the reliability of admitted hearsay in a due process 
context. 326 
Under this proposed approach, a seemingly just conviction under 
facts such as those in Alcalde327 should be upheld. In contrast, a 
prosecution under facts such as those in Pheaster328 ought to result in a 
judgment of acquittal due to insufficiency of the evidence at the close of 
the case. This approach would lead to the same result as has been 
reached in many cases approving the admissibility of Hillman-type 
evidence: There was abundant independent evidence of the 
nondec1arant's conduct in them, although most of the courts did not cite 
that fact as a consideration in their review.329 A jurisdiction would be 
well advised either to codify this corroboration requirement, or 
explicitly adopt it through case law. 
prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts. 
[AJ piece of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when 
corroborated by other evidence."); cf Wynn v. State, 718 A.2d 588,606-07 (Md. 1998) (Raker, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the "doctrine of chances," which takes into account the unlikelihood of 
coincidence); supra note 287. 
325 See supra note 285. 
326 See supra note 287. 
327 See supra Part III.C.l. 
328 See supra Part III.B. 
329 See Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 294 (1892); Thornton v. State, 45 
So.2d 298,300-02 (Ala. 1950); Zumbado v. State, 615 So.2d 1223, 1226-27, 1235-37 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1993); State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); State v. Via, 704 P.2d 
238,241,251 (Ariz. 1985); State v. Santangelo, 534 A.2d 1175,1179-80 (Conn. 1987); State v. 
Journey, 161 A. 515 (Conn. 1932); People v. Silvestri, 500 N.E.2d 456 (III. App. Ct. 1986); State 
v. McKinney, 33 P.3d 234, 238-39 (Kan. 2001), overruled on other grounds, State v. Davis, 158 
P.3d 317 (Kan. 2006); State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019, 1028-29 (Me. 1977) (referring to 
"abundant corroboration"); People v. Atwood, 154 N.W. 112, 117 (Mich. 1915); Bogan v. State, 
754 So.2d 1289 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000); Lisle v. State, 941 P.2d 459, 463-65 (Nev. 1997); State v. 
Thornton, 185 A.2d 9 (N.l. 1962); People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052, 1060-61 (N.y. 1999); 
Commonwealth v. Henderson, 472 A.2d 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); State v. Griffin, 528 S.E.2d 
668,670 (S.C. 2000) (finding that objected-to state ofrnind evidence was merely cumulative, due 
to much corroborating evidence); Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283, 286-87, 291-92 
(Austl.) (discussing testimony that defendant told witness he was going to meet victim, and 
defendant's confession to witness). 
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CONCLUSION 
Crawford and its progeny have restricted the application of the 
Confrontation Clause to "testimonial" hearsay. Until overruled as to 
nontestimonial hearsay, however, Ohio v. Roberts, and thus Idaho v. 
Wright, continue to apply, but now reincarnated as part of the due 
process guarantee, which, like an understudy taking the role of an 
indisposed Broadway star, is virtually untested in this context. The 
fairest approach regarding the admissibility of Hillmon-type forward-
looking statements of a declarant's intention offered to prove a 
nondeclarant-accused's subsequent conduct, and one that is 
constitutional under Roberts and Wright, is either to codify a 
requirement of corroborating evidence or to follow a new, two-step 
procedure under the case law. 
If the case law path is taken, first the statements should be admitted 
(absent circumstances supporting a finding of the declarant's 
insincerity) under the state of mind hearsay exception, Rule 803(3) or 
its state equivalent, as relevant to both the declarant's and 
nondeclarant's subsequent conduct. At the close of the trial, however, 
the court should decline to send the case to the jury absent the 
admission of some substantial evidence corroborating that the 
nondeclarant-accused's subsequent conduct was as reported in the 
Hillmon-type forward-looking statement of the declarant's intended 
acts. 
The due process clause, previously relegated to the rear of the 
column, has been thrust forward to frontline action. The approaches 
proposed here will satisfy the requirements of the due process clause, 
which, post-Crawford, must fill the vacuum left by the removal of 
Confrontation Clause protection as to nontestimonial hearsay offered 
against an accused. Taking either of these paths will achieve two 
important goals. First, it will protect the prosecution from being unable 
to prove its case-in-chief with often invaluable, irreplaceable evidence. 
It will also protect the accused from the possibility of an unjust 
conviction on too slim a record. 
